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Introduction
“The fact is, I remember them only in my body. I cannot quote a single line
from them, and I have not ever felt the need to return to them physically,
thought I know that I always return to them as I write.”
Dionne Brand, Map to the Door of No Return: Notes to Belonging

This honors thesis will examine Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar (1961) and Toni
Morrison’s Sula (1973) through the lens of gender, sexuality, and race using psychoanalytic
theory to reinterpret the bildungsroman. Juxtaposing two mid-twentieth-century American
women’s novels enables me to displace the individualist definition of the classic white male
coming of age plot to center the plot on women’s narratives. I hope to refigure the term for
an accurate representation of mid-century white and Black women’s development. I have
taken Diana Fuss’s theory of queer “identification” as the starting point for my readings of
both novels (Identification Papers 1995). My interpretations will focus on the double and
the Black girlfriend, patterns of violence, Catherine Belsey’s work on cultural ideology
(Critical Practice, 1980), and semiotic theory.
The male bildungsroman emerged around the eighteenth century in German
literature. In The Female Bildungsroman, literary critic Pin-chia Feng draws on Wilhelm
Dilthey‘s original definition of the term as “a linear progression toward knowledge and
social integration, and an upward movement toward spiritual fulfillment” (2). Of course,
the coming of age tale is not specific to German culture or to men. In the British and
American traditions, women’s novels of development have tended to act as prescriptions
for ladylike conduct. They were subtle but potent indoctrination of heteronormative,
middle-class, white behavior and outlines of ladylike conduct as subtle put potent
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indoctrination of gender norms. Literary theorist Annis Pratt suggests that early versions
of the female bildungsroman “prescribed submission to suffering and sadism as an
appropriate way to prepare a young girl for life” (13-14). “Life” in this context, means
heterosexual marriage and submission to men. The marriage plot thus became the
dominant form of women’s bildungsroman. Jane Austen’s novels are the most prominent
examples of this sort of text. Pratt contends that Austen’s work depicts women “growing
down” rather than growing up (14). She argues that nineteenth-century fictional
representations of women are treatises on how women should become objects rather than
subjects, for women’s development was stunted and regressive. However, critic Susan
Rosowski, in her essay on “The Novel of Awakening,” presents the view that Austen’s
protagonists are capable “of dual movement, both inward to self-knowledge and outward,
toward awareness of social, ethical, and philosophical truths” (67). Perhaps this is the case.
Austen’s heroines do ‘succeed’ by the parameters of Regency-Era England, attaining the
highest level of female embodiment in marrying financially upward. But Austen’s novels
still outline the path of respectable and economically sound matrimony, not necessarily
self-development. The marriage plot posits itself not as a developmental narrative but as a
narrative space where characters make concessions, compromises, and figure their way
into economic comfortability (Pratt 15).
Over time, women writers began to move the female coming of age story away from
the marriage plots. The of the “awakening” emerges towards the end of the nineteenth
century and beginning of the twentieth. Rosowski defines the novel of awakening through a
“protagonist who attempts to find value in a world defined by love and marriage” (49). The
protagonist of this type of novel is typically a white married woman of some means who
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“wakes” to the limitations of her gender and her marriage. The character’s development “is
inward, toward greater self-knowledge and subjectivity” which results in a “revelation of
the disparity between that self-knowledge and the nature of the world” (49). The character
discovers that marriage does not and cannot provide a happy ending. Rosowski focuses on
19th and some very early 20th century novels: Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, Kate Chopin’s
The Awakening, Willa Cather’s My Mortal Enemy, Agnes Smedley’s Daughter of Earth, and
George Eliot’s Middlemarch. In a majority of these works, the character turns to suicide as
the answer to the pain of being “awakened.” Rosowski comments on Chopin’s The
Awakening: “For only by complete isolation of self can Edna be truthful to her inner life.
Any contact with external reality threatens this dream” (54). The character’s inner world
becomes incompatible with reality, and so in order to maintain a loyalty to the self, she
must die. Protagonists who do not die, and in the nineteenth and early twenties there are
few, find “resolution only at great cost. . . she must deny one element of herself” (68). Death,
which represents the maximal loss in these narratives, also presents the most introspective
act that a character may take within the narrative form.
In the middle of the 20th century, women begin to survive their narratives. These
novels end neither in death nor in marriage but by looking toward and uncertain future.
This form applies to both men’s and women’s coming of age texts. The postmodern coming
of age novel centers on the individual, following meandering and convoluted narrative arcs.
Nicholas Donofrio, in “Esther Greenwood’s Internship” cites The Bell Jar and The Catcher in
the Rye as novels that “deserve to be read as failed bildungsromans… because they
ultimately decline to narrate their protagonists’ passage into romantic and professional
maturity” (241). Donofrio also concedes that for the female protagonists of Austen, Bronte,
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and Eliot, “mentors are hard to come by, lessons appear more coercive than educational
and mastery is rarely achieved” (243). To define the bildungsroman in such stringent terms
thus excludes a long history of women’s coming of age texts, none of which end neatly in
the independent adulthood of the male protagonist.
By this contention, no woman’s narrative and more so no non-white person’s
narrative, can ever be a bildungsroman. Ideological constraints for young white women,
and young women and men of color prohibit ascension into “romantic and professional
maturity.” The so-called “maturity” is one only accessible to privileged white men. Donofrio
does admit that depicting The Bell Jar and Catcher in the Rye as failed “is therefore to insist
on a very specific definition of failure indeed,” and proposes classifying The Bell Jar as a
modern novel of the internship—which is a definition still limited by class (247). If the
bildungsroman genre cannot even include quintessentially white male texts such as The
Catcher in the Rye, or texts of white female privilege such as Austen’s work or The Bell Jar,
then the term itself has failed—not the novels. Perhaps the coming of age narrative should
not need to follow the limiting linearity of Dilthey. Rather than create subcategories, the
shifting the definition of bildungsroman to encompass marginalized perspectives is
necessary. Reading The Bell Jar and Sula as bildungsroman within the context of the gender
and race principles which govern Esther, Nel, and Sula’s development permits a decentering of the term from its white male origins.
My de-centering of The Bell Jar and Sula also relies on a reading of the texts through
“identification” forming rather than “identity” building. Identity operates in classical as is a
perceived endpoint or goal. Identity is not a plausible term for the fluctuating conception of
the human self. For this reason, this thesis will rework the bildungsroman along the lines of
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the “identification” theory first employed by Sigmund Freud and later appropriated by
Diana Fuss in her text Identification Papers (1995).
Identification more accurately describes the ongoing process of self-creation in the
individual as a subject. Where identity is constructed on the basis of “facts” about the self,
identification arrives on the basis of relations to external experiences. Fuss defines
identification as “the psychical mechanism that produces self-recognition” and the process
which “inhabits, organizes, instantiates identity” (2). She analyzes and reworks Freud to
produce a more socially accurate definition based in queer theory and avoids Freud’s more
homophobic, misogynistic, and racist pitfalls. Freud bases his identification theory upon an
assumption of gender and sexual binary, which Fuss distinguishes as “identification (the
wish to be the other) from sexual object-choice (the wish to have the other)” along the lines
of a male/female dichotomy (11). In a world where sexuality and gender are far more
complex than Freud ever could have predicted, identification based on a binary is not a
reasonable explanation. Such a binary pathologizes homosexuality as confused “wish to be
other” (to be like someone of the same gender) rather than “wish to have other” (wish to
have sex with someone of the same gender). The subject’s desire for one sex can only be
secured through a corresponding identification with the other sex, coexistence of the two
“would be a logical impossibility for Freud” (67). As a foundational assumption, it is of
course a tenuous one at best. On the basis of queer theory, Fuss problematizes this
assumption and postulates that the two concepts may be entangled, if not one and the same
(11). This interpretation of identification deconstructs Freud’s rigid gender binary and his
reasoning for pathologizing homosexuality. According to Fuss, all desires are mixed with
identifications, and all identifications are somewhat desirous. She understands desire as
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instrumental in the creation of self and subjectivity. Identification follows the logical
transference of “she is X, therefore I am X” as persisting to, “she is X, I desire her, therefore I
am also X.” If “identification is the mechanism Freud summons to keep desire from
overflowing its socially sanctioned borders;” then it is the mechanism that permits the
reading of female protagonists’ development (45). Aligning identification with queer desire
de-centers the developmental plot of the bildungsroman from its heterosexual origins.
In seeking to use identification as a means of understanding and interrogating the
women’s bildungsroman, this thesis will integrate psychoanalytic readings of race and
queerness in the texts with specific emphasis on “ideology” in literature. Ideology is the
grounding space of human psychology and social phenomena which both questions and
substantiates the discourse of a text. British literary critic Catherine Belsey, in Critical
Practice, draws on the work of Louis Althusser to define literary ideology as producing “the
relations of production, the social relationships which are the necessary condition for the
existence and perpetuation of the capitalist mode of production” (56). Ideology is the
human symbol system of linguistics which describes human relationships between self and
world, self and community, self and other, the “condition of the action,” which produces
“identification with the ‘I’ of the discourse” (62). Ideology coerces the writer into
perpetuating and engaging with it. Divorcing literature from ideology is therefore an
insurmountable and useless task. It is the work of the critic to dig through a text to discover
ideology. But reading for ideology is not the same as reading for intent. Rather, the process
of analyzing ideology “is not inevitable, in the sense that texts do not determine like fate the
way in which they must be read” (69). Although ideology informs a reading, it does not
mandate it. The meaning making of literature is an ever-fluid process of exchange between
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reader, author, and language. Perhaps this sounds familiar—the work of reading is itself a
work of identification between reader and text.
Therefore, Belsey calls for the reader to pay close attention to the “conventional”
ideology of texts. She states that she is “concerned at this stage primarily with ways in
which they are conventionally read” and how meaning can be lifted from them (69). In
general, a text will refer to a conventional ideology, because a specific person in a specific
context wrote the text. Belsey provides the (apt for the purposes of this project) example of
“women as a group” who, in the context of dominant culture, “are both produced and
inhibited by contradictory discourses” (65). This unmarked “woman” of Belsey’s
participates in both “the liberal humanist discourse of freedom, self-determination and
rationality” and also “the specifically feminine discourse offered by society of submission,
relative inadequacy and irrational intuition” (65). She does clarify that a generalization as
such is quite broad, and although it is a summary of the demands of womanhood—she is
not entirely wrong. Most individuals reflect the intersection of a number of contradictory
discourses that produce the ideology by which they live. Ideology is always present in the
text, always producing and obscuring meaning. Reading becomes a matter of excavation
through layers of ideology and language to determine what work a text does, what cultural
significance it produces.
Reading The Bell Jar and Sula both within and against their respective ideologies is
crucial to a sensitive and thorough analysis. As a white twenty-first-century woman
performing a reading of texts outside the dominant ideology of my own time and race,
deference to ideology and background historical content is necessary. This permits a
reading that derives not from my personal positionality, but from my training in careful
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reading and my education in English critical analysis. Valerie Smith, in “Black Feminist
Theory and the Representation of the ‘Other’,” describes the term “black feminist theory” as
not dependent on the positionality of the theorist, but “a way of reading inscriptions of race
(particularly but not exclusively blackness), gender (particularly but not exclusively
womanhood), and” particularly the middle “class in modes of cultural expression” (370).
Reading texts with Black feminist theory or with attention to the intersectionality of race
and gender is a process of educated analysis. With this reasoning, despite my personal
positionality, I hope to read The Bell Jar and Sula in terms of their race, gender, and class
inscriptions in accordance with their historical contexts. I hope to discern how both
support and resist their dominant ideologies within and outside of to their dominant
ideologies.
Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar was first published in 1963 under the pseudonym
“Victoria Lucas,” exclusively in the United Kingdom, and just months before Plath’s suicide.
It wasn’t released in the United States until 1971. The book garnered attention due to its
obvious basis in autobiography and the pre-existing sensation of her suicide. The
protagonist, Esther Greenwood, is a white, middle class, nineteen-year-old girl from an
unnamed suburb of Boston, Massachusetts, whose story and biography closely mirrors the
events of Plath’s life and background. Plath’s life allows for some degree of assumption
about Esther. Where the text is vague, it is easy to determine where Plath is drawing from
in her autobiography, which makes a reading based in Plath’s life tempting. Jacqueline
Rose, in The Haunting of Sylvia Plath, suggests that Plath’s famous suicide “engenders a
literary movement constituted in the very image of her death” which either “destroys the
culture” or operates as “the precondition for the culture to survive” (23). Often for readers,
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her death either substantiates the meaning of her texts, or ruins it by obscuring the
impressiveness of her writing in autobiography. Tomasz Fisiak characterizes the novel as a
“feminist autobiography” in his work “Feminist Auto/biography as a Means of Empowering
Women”: “The usage of the auto/biographical mode is just one of the main components to
gain autonomy through writing… To liberate one’s voice, the author creates a distinct
written self (fictive or not) that gains control over her production” (190). Fisiak’s alarming
commentary pays no notice to the fact that The Bell Jar is deliberately categorized as a
piece of fiction. Thirty years earlier, critic Henry Schevy called for a separation of Plath
from her text, calling it an “almost impossible task” of saving “the tale from the Plath cult
which threatens to obscure the quality of the writing with biographical detail” (18). Plath’s
intent is not unimportant, but in the case of a text which autobiographical reading is so
easy and so damaging, it should be treated with great delicacy. Rather, the cultural and
ideological context should be afforded more attention.
A holistic understanding of 1950s ideology per Belsey’s suggestion is necessary in
order to parse the meaning making of The Bell Jar. Linda Wagner-Martin, in The Bell Jar: A
Novel of the Fifties, turns to Plath’s political ideals to contextualize the novel, “She voted for
Adlai Stevenson (though her mother voted for Eisenhower) and lamented the
McCarthyism, isolationism, and conservatism that had become pervasive American
attitudes” (5). The politics of both Plath and the fifties situate The Bell Jar as pushing
against the constraints of culture and questioning the role that a (white) woman can play in
American society. Wagner-Martin’s remark that “the assumption was that every person
alive was heterosexual, and the birthrate rose incredibly” during the decade in question, is
also quite potent in light of a reading which factors queer desire into the text (5). This is
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partially what makes Esther such an interesting albeit greatly flawed character. Esther
stands outside of 1950s heterosexual ideology by avoiding marriage, engaging in extramarital sex, and pursuing a career in writing. At the same, she is privileged, petulant, and
racist in a number of instances across the novel. The Bell Jar is progressive for illustrating a
young woman who breaks the mold of white feminine norms, but it is regressive in the
ways that it does not. This reading will thus examine how much Esther’s identification
centers on her whiteness and her privilege. I will seek to consider both the successes and
the shortcomings of the text in thereby de-centering the bildungsroman by reading Esther
as a character simultaneously resistant and loyal to her ideological context.
Sula (1973) is Toni Morrison’s second novel. The text follows the development of
two young Black girls in the “Bottom” a neighborhood in the fictional town of Medallion,
Ohio. Sula escapes the ascription of authorial intent readings. But as a Black as well as
female writer, Morrison falls under a different sort of scrutiny, described in a quote by Alice
Godfrey in “The Black Women Who Wrote America’s Earliest Autofiction”: “’black women’s
literature, particularly autobiographies, has too often been subject to severe criticism, such
accounts often being deemed too personal, or not political enough’” (Kazeem). Sula is often
reductively taken as a text about female friendship, rather than social and political
positionality. Given the white supremacist ideology of American culture, Black women’s
writing always already stands outside of the dominant discourse and is forced to make its
own spaces. Morrison asks about “literary blackness” in the “Preface” of Playing in the Dark,
“What happens to the writerly imagination of a black author who is at some level always
conscious of representing one’s own race to, or in spite of, a race of readers that
understands itself to be ‘universal’ or race-free?” (xii). This question uncovers the tension
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of between Black authorship and the white reader with the dominant white readership in
the context of America. Surrounded by an ideology of self vs. other and white as
“unmarked,” Morrison questions the consequences of being a Black writer and performing
Blackness for a white audience while at the same time, not watering her writing down.
Which is precisely why Sula presents a compelling text to examine for the purposes
of reading identification. The Bottom is a Black community positioned up on a hillside,
overlooking the white community down in the valley. Nel and Sula’s development occurs in
the context of the pre-othered Bottom, inscribed onto their bodies as pre-othered Black
women. Where Esther stands outside of ideology by the choice afforded to her as a white
woman, Nel and Sula are excluded from dominant ideology of white American culture since
birth. Although the Bottom provides an alternative Black ideology, it still conscribes to the
heterosexual. Thus, Nel and Sula form their friendship as “creating something else to be”—
a third space in which to come of age. Sula is not a tale of two different development plots,
but of one conjoined one—a “double female bildungsroman” as termed by critic Pin-chia
Feng in “We Was Girls Together” (39). Each seeing herself in the other, Nel and Sula grow
up in an equal exchange of identification. Sula and Nel present precisely the push and pull
of identification/desire described by Fuss in Identification Papers. Critics such as Barbara
Smith (“Toward a Black Feminist Criticism”), Deborah McDowell (“New Directions in Black
Feminist Criticism”), and Barbara Johnson (“Lesbian Spectacles”) have presented differing
opinions about queerness between Nel and Sula. Toni Morrison disagrees with any
implications of queer desire, cited as saying “there is no homosexuality in Sula” in
Conversations with Toni Morrison (157). Therefore, reading queerness depends not only on
the reader’s definition of desire, but also on a more protean understanding of queer theory.
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Lee Edelman suggests in Queer Theory and the Death Drive that queer theory constitutes
“the site where the radical threat posed by irony” in text, “which heteronormative culture
displaces onto the figure of the queer” (24). The queer figure thus becomes the very
disfiguration of identity in being deviant to ideological norms. Ideology positions queerness
and Blackness as other by the standards of white America. Reading Nel and Sula through
the queer lens of identification creates a developmental reading that has specific grounding
in the social/cultural positions of the text.
Both The Bell Jar and Sula exemplify compelling iterations of a long-standing history
of women’s writing. Both novels also depart from heterosexist ideological patterns. Sula
further departs from white supremacy; The Bell Jar does not. This is not to say that these
novels are the only novels to depart from these patterns. Rather, I chose these two novels
because I have loved them. Both are novels in which I have seen pieces of myself, both are
books that have contributed to my own coming of age. In choosing these novels to position
against one another, I hope to conduct a thorough analysis of white women’s and Black
women’s development in the twentieth century. Reading both novels through the lens of
race, sexuality, gender, and culture permits a more open-ended view of the bildungsroman.
Analyzing these novels through the psychoanalytic lens of identification will produce a
more comprehensive perspective on women’s coming of age narratives.
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Chapter I: Hysteria and Serial Suicide in Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar
“The patterns of pain in the bildungsroman are embedded in image,
leitmotif, and larger narrative patterns; their antitheses are images of desire
for authentic selfhood.”
Annis Pratt, Archetypal Patterns in Women’s Literature

In her 1995 text, Identification Papers, Diana Fuss appropriates Freud’s Totem and
Taboo (1913) and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) in order to construct
a theory on “identification” that can be applied to present-day psychology. More so than
this, Fuss’s work makes it possible to apply Freudian theories to literature of young women
without resorting to reductive and degrading Oedipal readings and Electra complexes.
Fuss’s identification reveals a developmental arc that gives ample attention to the gender
differences that distinguish women’s coming of age fictions from that of men. In Totem and
Taboo, Freud employs the story of a group of sons murdering and cannibalizing their father
to explain an Oedipal working of identification (Fuss 32). Fuss theorizes that this story
“uncovers the violence at the heart of identification” (34). The children destroy the father
and orally incorporate his identity into their own. From this Fuss also conjectures the
“ambivalence” of identification via the son’s simultaneous love of and hate for the father.
Ambivalent identifications express how identification travels “a double current, allowing
for the possibility of multiple and contradictory identifications coexisting in the subject at
the same time” (34). The act of identification is both a murder illustrating hate, and an
ingesting suggesting love. As an act of violent identification, the father becomes entombed
within the sons, a part of their own identity. Fuss’s analysis of this story emphasizes the
insecurity of identification in its precarious position at the intersection of love and hate.
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The second story that Fuss examines comes out of Freud’s Group Psychology (1921).
In a short passage from the text describing homosexuality in a girl’s boarding school, Freud
claims that young girls possess a greater ease of identification which leads to homosexual
confusion. Young women, by Freud’s count, have a greater “’openness’ to emotions” which
mitigates the hysterical spread of feelings (Fuss 114). The terming of homosexuality as
“spreading” throughout the girls boarding school proves Freud’s effective pathologizing of
queer desire as a side effect of female hysteria. Freud thus conflates the medical (at the
time) female hysteria with queer desire, setting the precedent by which psychologists will
vilify homosexuality for years to come. In several other studies, such as Dora (1905) and
“The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman” (1920), Freud uses this same
comparison to explain away queerness as a hysterical identification. Fuss describes Freud’s
belief that women desiring other women confuse the question, “How can I be a woman,”
with “How can I have one” (29). Where Freud manages to use this “confused” conflation to
prove the pathology of homosexuality, Fuss aligns it to re-define identification, suggesting
that Freud is correct in the comparison but wrong in pathologizing it. Freud’s claims of
binary desires are so precarious “precisely because desire and identification cannot be
securely separated or easily prevented from turning back on one another” (77). What
Freud claims is pathology, may actually be human nature. Identification substantiates
desire, and vice versa. The two are interdependent and analogous.
In the clinical sense, hysteria no longer exists. The prescription of the term stems
from a failed understanding of women’s mental illness, cultural parameters which leave
women without voices, and a dismissal of women’s physical and emotional pain. While
psychologists no longer recognize clinical hysteria, the principle of the phenomenon is still
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worth examining for its use in the literary arts. Representations of the woman hysteric
reach from madwoman to prophetess: e.g. Bertha in Jane Eyre (Charlotte Bronte), Pecola in
The Bluest Eye (Toni Morrison), Medea in her eponymous ancient Greek drama, Medea
(Euripides). In linguistic theory, hysteria is a particularly potent device in its semiotic
dimensions: “The hysteric speaks through her symptom, transforming the body into a
textual utterance. Although the hysteric’s somatic symptom ostensibly works to block
interpretation… its very unreadability provokes, even coerces a reading” (Fuss 116).
Hysteria relegates the subject to the pre-language state of infancy, occupying a form of
communication that cannot be read, but must be. Elizabeth Grosz engages Julia Kristeva’s
work on semiotic language in Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction. Kristeva believes that
hysteria resists the symbol system of human language, because “the symbolic is based on
the ‘repression’ or subsumation of the chaotic semiotic fluxes” (152). Because hysteria
cannot be read or logically communicated through human language, it speaks through
semiotics, the cries and movements of the pre-linguistic. The semiotic speaks through the
“pleasures, sounds, colours, or movements experienced in the child’s body” (152). French
psychoanalytic feminist Julia Kristeva connects female speech to the semiotic because of
the psychological link between mother and child. Ann Rosalind Jones reports Kristeva’s
belief that women “speak and write as ‘hysterics’” and therefore as “outsiders to maledominated discourse” of the symbolic language of speech (249). Women’s texts therefore
communicate using both the semiotic and the symbolic. E. Miller Budick, in “The Feminist
Discourse of Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar” argues that “Plath not only perceives the world in
terms of competing male and female languages, but that she herself attempts to write in the
feminine” (873). Reading Esther Greenwood’s mental illness and suicide attempts in The
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Bell Jar as a hysteria inscribed through the semiotic produces a more nuanced analysis of
the text as a bildungsroman. Conceding Esther’s unreadability as a hysteric character
mandates that the critic must read Esther against her own word in order to parse the
meaning of the text.
The Bell Jar’s narration unfolds from the hysteric mind of Esther Greenwood. Esther
is not only an unreliable narrator, she is psychologically damaged and suicidal. Per Fuss
and Kristeva’s theory, this makes Esther an unreadable character who also demands
reading. Beyond being an unreliable narrator, she is also a dangerous one due to the
autobiographical leanings of the text. Critics of The Bell Jar too often rely on content from
Plath’s life for analysis. Literary scholar Henry Schevy credits Plath’s death with the
sensationalism and misunderstanding of her work, contending that too many “pay
insufficient attention to the division between art and life” (20). Readers look to Plath’s dark
fictional work and see Sylvia, rather than Esther. It is useful to consider Plath’s perspective,
but analysis that rests on the novel as an autobiographical work does a disservice to the
text. To take Plath, or Esther for that matter, at her word, is to forget that fiction is meant to
produce cultural meaning rather than personal. As American Culture scholar Kate Baldwin
reflects, “If, as Esther constantly reminds us, she is a master of deception, might it not be
important to read her against her word?” (59). Not only can Plath not be used to read the
text, but Esther cannot be believed. Baldwin calls for a reading of the text with skepticism
of Esther’s narrative authority and deference to ideology. Reading the novel from a place of
distance while understanding of the specific positionality of Esther as a nineteen-year-old
white woman living in New England in the year 1953 will produce the most comprehensive
outcome.
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Feminist critic Catherine Belsey engages “ideology” as the most useful means of
reading cultural meaning in text. Belsey indicates that literature has real world power due
to is effects “on the ways in which people grasp themselves and their relation to the real
relations in which they live” (66). Ideology in literary texts thus becomes critical to
determining the action or passivity of a character. French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, one
of the louder voices in psychoanalysis of the subject in linguistics, believes that subjectivity
is constructed through the child’s ability to produce subject-position: identification with
first a mirror image (his famous “Mirror Phase”) and then with the first-person singular
pronoun (Belsey 60). The child able to produce the mirror phase but unable to enter into
the symbolic order of language and the dominant discourse of ideology becomes “sick.”
Belsey revises this theory, suggesting that those left out of the dominant discourse (women,
people of color, the working class, those positioned as the “other” or “object” in dominant
subject positions) are more likely to becomes sick (66). Therefore, looking to the ways that
these characters resist or adhere to ideology, coerces the best understanding of the cultural
work of the text.
Against the backdrop of a boiling New York City, the first half of the novel chronicles
Esther’s growing sense of listlessness and anxieties about the future. Esther considers
normative women’s paths which lead back to her college boyfriend Buddy Willard, or the
unorthodox decisions which might bring her to a career writing in New York City. Critics
such as Plath scholar Linda Wagner-Martin rest much interpretation on this section: “The
Bell Jar is plotted to establish two primary themes: that of Greenwood’s developing
identity, or lack of it; and that of her battle against submission to the authority of both older
people and, more pertinently, of men” (56-57). Wagner-Martin is correct in noting the
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novel’s careful plotting around this imagery as it is the dominant ideology that makes up
the backdrop of the novel. The now famous fig tree metaphor serves this purpose almost
exclusively: “I saw my life branching out before me like the green fig tree in the story…”
(Plath 77). Choice itself is a 1950s project for the white person. Even as a working class
woman, Esther has the opportunity for upward mobility due to funded education and white
privilege. Positioned at a point when women’s simultaneous restriction and empowerment
left many tied up, Esther finds herself in a position familiar to women of the era. Baldwin
characterizes her as “a character who throws herself against the limited options available
to her like a furious pinball, aiming for and then bouncing away from discrete targets of
female identity” (60). Reading her against the marginalized identities of the narrative—a
Russian translator at the UN and the “Negro” orderly at the hospital—Baldwin understands
Esther as “the American girl spoiled by choice” and, coarsely, as “a little shit” (71). She is
not entirely wrong—Esther’s internal career discourse derives from the privilege of choice
offered to white women in the 1950s for the first time. Though Esther’s family comes from
a working-class background, she possesses the upward mobility of the Boomer generation.
Her ennui and her depression are privileges.
Esther’s anxieties are typical of the 19-year-old girl in the fifties. Women, such as
Esther’s boss Jay Cee at “Ladies’ Day” magazine, were just beginning to move out of the
home in small numbers, providing examples and glimmers of hope for ambitious young
women. At the same time, “the average age for women to marry” was lingering at “20.3”
years old (Wagner-Martin 3). Esther is nineteen at the beginning of the novel and turns
twenty towards the end (Plath 203). Her marriage anxieties may seem premature to a
twenty-first-century-reader, but a reader in the fifties, Esther's concern is quite warranted.
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This cultural background also makes Esther’s careful resistance to marriage quite unique.
Although Esther does want a family, she questions that desire and rejects Buddy’s proposal
of marriage which she recounts in memory (92). Wagner-Martin reminds that at the time,
“the non-married lifestyle was as suspect as deviant sexual behaviors” (3). Remaining
single meant a conscious choice live outside of dominant American ideology of marriage
and family. Esther’s resistance to ideology positions her as deviant, opening up the space
for a queer reading of the text. As Renée Dowbnia notes in “Consuming Appetites,” Esther’s
choice to use “spending money and shopping privileges to buy birth control” rather than
buying clothing and magazines places her external to 1950s norms of womanhood (586).
In the context of the 1950s, Esther is an anomaly.
Although Esther’s decisions make her radical, in the first half of the novel she
maintains a loyalty to normative heterosexual desires. Historian Lisa Lindquist Dorr
reinforces the point that marriage, gender roles, and the self-sufficient nuclear family were
integral to “what made America strong as a superior white nation” over the Russian
communists (28). But with the advent of teenage dating and “going steady” in the 1950s,
white men also began to pose a sexual threat. Dating was meant as a precursor to
marriage—an institution which was becoming suspected as emasculating of the husbands
(30). Thus, the media began to perpetuate a narrative of male “sexual aggression” and
coercion as necessary for the “masculinity and matrimonial success” of America’s young
white men (31). At the same time, young women were expected to remain steadfast against
the advances of their male partners to protect the requisite purity of white female gender
norms. Young women were raised to believe that their intrinsic “value resided in their
virtue and attractiveness as a wife,” and therefore young women who participated in 1950s
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dating culture resented and rightly feared the advances of their male suitors (33). This also
places Esther as squarely outside of the dominant ideology of the 1950s, as a woman who is
interested in and seeks out extra-marital sexual activity. Though a young, attractive white
women, Esther contradicts heterosexual ideology for her resistance to marriage and
interest in heterosexual intercourse.
As noted, Esther’s struggle to self-define is a white woman’s problem. In the context
of the Cold War as well as the boom of fifties heterosexual ideology, “racial others” inhabit
the framework of the novel as outside culture as well. Kate Baldwin reads Esther against
the more minor but still present racial other characters in the novel who inhabit, “The Bell
Jar connects the ideas of female discontentment with the Russian and Negro as important
players in U.S. Cold War cosmography. It elaborates on the alternative intelligences present
in a narrative that also announces a kind of female domestic incarceration” (Baldwin 58).
More privileged than but also as equally restricted as the Russian translator Esther sees in
New York and the Black orderly she meets much later in the novel, Esther struggles with
the confusing positionality of being white and a woman in 1953. She casts about for self,
but there is nobody with whom she can identify. In a scene on a date at the United Nations,
Esther wishes to physically inhabit the Russian translator but with what Baldwin calls
entirely “removed selfhood” (66). She hopes to be swallowed up by the entity of someone
else without ever having to know her, a sublimation into someone else like the father in
Freud’s story of the cannibal sons. Later, when interred at the city hospital in Boston,
Esther disregards and mistreats a Black orderly that “her imprisonment in part relies on
his” (Baldwin 73). Here too, Esther de-humanizes the racial other for the sake of bolstering
her own misery. This thought process was used by America to fight the degenerate home
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lives of “others” abroad (the Russian communists) and at home (Black individuals) to
maintain the country’s white supremacist ideology. As individuals whose ideological
existence in 1950s America relies on an opposition to America’s white national narrative,
people of other races occupy background space as objects rather than subjects. The Russian
woman and the Black orderly serve as objects for Esther to push up against and consider,
but never identify with or even acknowledge as people due to her racism. Though the
characters of color in The Bell Jar serve to construct the background and provide outlets for
Esther to enact the frustrations of being white and female, they remain caricatures taken
for granted.
White American ideology relies so much on the exclusion of racial others that such
characters cannot even make Esther recognize her whiteness. For the first half of the novel,
Esther inhabits the spaces of white women, a women’s college in New England and an allfemale summer program in Manhattan. Though women’s spaces, they are not entirely
enclosed against men and non-white characters. At college, though surrounded by other
college girls; Esther dates Yale medical student “hypocrite” Buddy Willard and outsmarts
male professors (Plath 52, 37). The Amazon Hotel in Manhattan where she and the other
girls who have won internships at fictional “Ladies Day” Journal live is for young women
“with wealthy parents who wanted to be sure their daughters would be living where men
couldn’t get at them and deceive them” (4). The girls may be safe within the hotel, but once
they venture out into the city, all manner of men abound. Outside the hotel, Esther and her
friends encounter types like Lenny Shepherd the radio personality, Constantin the
simultaneous interpreter, and the Peruvian date rapist Marco (11, 51, 103). Each
appearance triggers a psychological reaction in Esther analogous to contamination. Budick
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indicates that Esther’s feminine environments “ought to have provided Esther with the
language and identity” (or identifications) “she seeks. But each has abnegated authority…
by allowing male language to infect and dominate female expression” (875). The intrusion
of the male language via patriarchal presences, and the interruption of Esther’s beloved
white supremacist ideology by non-white characters drives Esther to an obsession with
purity. Images of water, bathing, and spiritual hygiene emerge in the text whenever
Esther’s white female fragility is jeopardized. Esther believes herself contaminated after
witnessing lurid sexuality between her friend Doreen and Lenny Shepherd. At the
beginning of the night, Esther compares Doreen to a Black woman—"dusky as a bleachedblonde Negress”—and herself to a “big smudgy-eyed Chinese woman” at the end of the
night (Plath 18). The racializing of Doreen and her sexual engagement with a man leads to
the first of Esther’s racist purifying rituals. Esther draws a bath and reveals that “I never
feel so much myself as when I’m in a hot bath,” moving back towards freedom from what
she perceives to be immoral sexuality and white purity (20). Although Esther maintains a
rigid heterosexuality, Dorr’s writings on the violent gender binary of the 1950s make it
clear that sexual desire for men cannot be enacted safely—exemplified in Esther’s rigorous
attention to cleanliness following Doreen’s interaction. Per Fuss’s blurred lines of desire
for/identification with, though Esther exclusively desires men, she cannot properly
construct identifications with them without needing a bath at the least and weathering
violence at the most.
The alternative, is of course, identification with women. Esther is pre-queered
because of her unorthodox ideas about heterosexual ideology. But in the first half of the
novel, she maintains a subscription to heterosexual desire—which cannot be fulfilled
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safely. Lee Edelman, in Queer Theory and the Death Drive, reflects on queerness as
dispossessing “the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent
reality of the social” (6). Esther’s sexuality deals in the negatives of dominant discourse
enough that it reads as queer, prior to and independent of any express desire for women.
The question becomes whether or not Esther’s theoretically inscribed queerness can
translate into viable identification with women. Esther’s identification practices only
manifest on the other side of her sexual abuse and suicide attempts, in the space of the
mental hospital. In the first section of the novel, Esther makes tries out identifications with
other women, but usually falls short. In the case of the female Russian translator, Esther
wishes to “crawl into her and spend the rest of my life barking out one idiom after another”
(Plath 75). The desire to enter the Russian woman nears the consumption and
incorporation of identification (per Totem and Taboo). But this identification reflects the
negative of identity, Esther as the incorporated object, predicated on the “the alarming
lure” of a quite Kristevan “empty speech” (Baldwin 66). Though Esther’s interest in the
Russian woman is a desire directed towards a woman, it is a desire to disappear into the
ideological other completely and therefore not an identification. Esther’s desire for her
friend Doreen, another girl on the summer program in New York, is a different sort of
animal—“Everything she said was like a secret voice speaking straight out of my own
bones” (Plath 7). This identification too is ontologically linked to a Kristevan conception of
semiotic subjectivity. Doreen’s voice described as speaking from Esther’s own body
represents the body-speech of the hysteric, and thus a “hysterical” identification. Doreen as
well might occupy the queer space outside white feminine heterosexuality, for her perusal
of Lenny. But instead, the identification is marred and broken by the heterosexual intrusion
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of Lenny, with whom Doreen begins a normative relationship—“she spent most of her free
time with Lenny Shepherd now” (25). Afterwards, Esther pledges her loyalty to Betsy, a
sexually clean girl also on the summer program, who Esther believes she “resembled at
heart” (22). But Betsy, like Doreen, is an insufficient double, who cannot facilitate
meaningful identification in being so “easily categorized—stereotyped” (Wagner-Martin
65). Though surrounded by safe white women, Esther cannot identify with them.
Queerness is interrupted by dominant heterosexual ideology, and white supremacy is
threatened by the presence of non-white people, disallowing Esther from fully identifying
with other women.
Which is why the sexual assault scene in Chapter Nine figures as the prompt for
Esther’s descent into hysteria and suicidal urges. The ideology of present day understands
the attack as a sexual assault. But 1950s ideology obscures this, for Esther is on a date with
her attacker—a Latin American man named Marco. “Date Rape” as it is understood now,
did not exist in 1953, nor even in 1963 when The Bell Jar was published. Though Dorr
catalogues examples of date rape in The Perils of the Back Seat, she clarifies in the notes
that “date rape or acquaintance rape were terms coined in the 1970s” and still remained
relatively invisible, seen “as a ‘lesser’ crime either because the woman somehow ‘asked for
it’ or because the associated trauma is presumed to be less because she knew her attacker”
(43 n5). The assault Esther experiences is not even a true rape—it is the kind of attack that
women expected to endure on dates at the time. In 1950s sexual ideology and dating
culture, this sort of assault was normal: “Sociological studies made it frighteningly clear
how frequent male aggression was and, indeed, how normal, accepted and silenced it
remained” (34). On this basis, the assault is silenced first by the text and doubly by the
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critics who fail to acknowledge it. Scholars often skirt around Esther’s sexual assault,
describing Marco’s actions as an “attempt to rape” (Boyer 210). But at the same time, the
violent language of the attack and Marco’s specific designation as “Peruvian” signals what
1950s constructions of rape looked like:
Then he threw himself face down as if he would grind his body through me and into
the mud. “It’s happening,” I thought. “It’s happening. If I just lie here and do nothing
it will happen.” Marco set his teeth to the strap at my shoulder and tore my sheath to
the waist. I saw the glimmer of bare skin, like a pale veil separating two bloodyminded adversaries. “Slut!” The word hissed by my ear. “Slut!” The dust cleared, and
I had a full view of the battle. I began to writhe and bite… Then I fisted my fingers
together and smashed them at his nose. It was like hitting the steel plate of a
battleship. Marco sat up. I began to cry. (Plath 109)
Plath’s characterization of the attack using words like “threw himself,” “grind,” “tore,”
bloody-minded,” and “battle” associate the scene with violent rape. Dorr outlines several
rape cases from the 1950s in her article, noting that each incident survives because “they
outline the extremes of male aggression, and because they resulted in conviction, no small
feat at a time when women were blamed routinely for their inability to fend off aggressive
men” (34). Both the scenario of the date and Esther’s ability to effectively fend off her
assailant silence this scene as a “non-rape” in terms of dominant fifties ideology. Neither
Plath nor Esther have the appropriate language for the attack, and it sinks into the
background. However, the violence and racial construction of the scene ontologically link
the attack to a rape.
As does Esther’s response. Although she remains a virgin, she is still physically
damaged via her dress. The “glimmer of bare skin, like a pale veil” indicates a transgression
of psychological and bodily integrity and drives Esther to fight back (Plath 109). Although
Esther’s action in the scene can be ideologically read as what she should do (per the 1950s),
it can also be read per today as evidence that she would have suffered worse had she not
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acted. Boyer has a similar claim, describing Esther’s move to fight back as an attempt to
create her story “in blood because language eludes her” (209). Boyer composes this
moment as an instance of the bodily inscription onto which trauma can be read. To return
to the 1950s, Marco’s racial designation—"from Peru”—describes the “racialized
narratives” of white women’s victimhood in rape in Dorr’s piece (Plath 103) (Dorr 28).
Juxtaposed with Doreen’s all-American date, “a tall boy in shirtsleeves and a blond
crewcut,” Marco is “also tall, but dark, with slightly longer hair” and has a “flickering smile”
which reminds Esther of snake (Plath 104, 105, 106). Marco fits among the other non-white
individuals in the territory of The Bell Jar. But unlike the Black orderly or the Russian
translator, Marco is an “other” in the white American ideological paradigm of the 1950s
who possesses an active status. Also, unlike the Black orderly or the Russian translator, this
moment signifies Esther’s usually unmarked race in the negative of Marco’s. Boyer alleges
that Marco wiping his spilled the blood onto a white handkerchief enacts Marco’s marking
of Esther’s white body: “This blood that Marco sheds and writes indelibly upon a white
background, is his text written upon an assaulted, nearly raped, woman” (209). After
wiping his nose onto a handkerchief, he then wipes his blood onto Esther’s cheek—
fulfilling Esther’s perceived racial tainting and performing a protracted sexual marking.
Marco exists only in this story as a construction of 1950s rape ideology, which relied
on the victimhood of white women and the aggression of non-white men, most
prototypically Black men. White men were supposed to be protectors of white women, and
Black men the aggressors. According to Dorr, for a century prior to the 1950s, “white
women had been warned of the dangers of black men” with a supposed lust for white flesh
(28). Dorr describes the much-circulated discourse in the South of the “black beast rapist,
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the mythical black man crazed to gratify his supposed lust for white women” (38).
According to the tale, roving gangs of Black youths were “known” to snatch white women
from their white dates back seats of cars and sexually brutalize them. These “cases” were
“more likely to be reported and accepted by authorities because they confirmed
assumptions held by many white southerners” (39). They were also more likely to be
fabricated, and it became quite common for white couples caught “necking” to blame young
Black men for sexually abusing the white women. As sexual-violence activist and lawyer G.
Chezia Carraway puts it, prosecution of rape cases perpetrated by non-white men was most
often as a “thinly veiled appeal for a public lynching” (1303). White men were, of course, a
much larger threat in the close quarters of 1950s dating culture, and women of color are
almost four times more likely than white women to be raped according to a 1987 study
(1303). The number of instances of sexual violence against both women of color and white
women in 1953, 1987, and in 2019 are much greater. Dorr’s cases of Black male rapists are
also specific to African American and white relations in the 1950s, but that should by no
means suggest that other men of color were not perceived to be predators.
As non-white as well as non-American, Marco stands outside of the white
heterosexual ideology of the 1950s, representing a threat to American ideals. Noting this, a
reader should approach an analysis of this scene with the assumption that Plath is likely to
have adhered to an ideology of racialized rape in order to make the psychological impact of
Esther’s assault evident. The scene produces a confluence of contradictory ideological
meanings. All at the same time, it is standard date activity, “date rape,” not rape, and
racially constructed abuse. The scene in itself is a hysteric one, which leads “the analyst
through a thicket of confusing and shifting identifications” (Fuss 116). Reading this scene,
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thus must rely on the identifications the both construct it and follow it. While Marco and
Esther dance prior to the assault, they dance, and Marco leads, and Esther “seemed to be
riveted to him” (Plath 107). This is emblematic of heterosexual desire: the consumption of
the passive (woman) by the active (man). Marco’s dual activity as a man and passivity as an
"other" is marked in this scene as a violent identification—one in which Esther is
consumed and then quickly rejected. Marco attacks, retreats, then marks Esther with his
own blood. Remaining is an ambivalent, hysterical identification—a simultaneous belief
that the attack is deserved and desirous as well as violent. Unable to reconcile what she
believes the attack to be—a nonevent, a narrow escape—with the trauma she feels, Esther
turns to self-violent identification. Esther attempts to simultaneously destroy and
incorporate an identification with Marco into her physical body.
Constructing this scene along the lines of what the twenty first century reader
would understand to be sexual assault is critical in explaining Esther’s psychological
response and descent into hysteria. Following the assault scene, Esther throws away all of
her clothing and begins rejecting the cleanliness adopted in the first half of the novel. This
begins Esther’s hysterical descent into ambivalent, violent identification. On the deserted
roof of the Amazon Hotel, Esther tosses her wardrobe away: “Piece by piece, I fed my
wardrobe to the night wind, and flutteringly, like a loved one’s ashes, the gray scraps were
ferried off, to settle here, there, exactly where I would never know, in the dark heart of New
York” (Plath 111). Wagner-Martin posits this is Esther’s rejection of femininity, of “the
traditional image of the pretty, smart girl, object for man’s acquisition” (61). Baldwin
renders it as a “rejection of consumer abundance” (62). Both are in part true. Replacing
Esther’s sexual self is a traumatized one. In place of the “pretty, smart girl” with all the
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tokens of Capital consumerist ideology—"…all those uncomfortable, expensive clothes…
same size-seven patent leather shoes… skimpy imitation silver-lamé bodice stuck on to a
big, fat cloud of white tulle…”—is a girl who feels alienated from her body (Plath 2).
Attractive advertising can no longer disguise the emptiness and trauma of Esther’s
confused identification with Marco. But beyond rejecting femininity or capitalism, Esther is
performing the first murder of the heterosexual identification with Marco. Esther was not
penetrated or physically harmed during her assault, but her dress was ripped to reveal her
naked body in all its white female fragility. Esther’s beautiful clothing and subscription to
1950s white feminine norms cannot protect her from the threat of heterosexuality. In a
way the pale glimmer of her naked body functions as a semiotic signal, an imperative to act,
revealing “the battle.”
Rejecting the feminine sexuality of her skimpy dresses, Esther seeks to formulate
identification with pure Betsy once more. In the morning, Esther boards the train home to
Boston wearing Betsy’s clothing. Henry Schevy points out Betsy’s loaned clothing, “Having
flung her clothes from the top of the hotel, she abandons her old self… for Betsy’s homespun blouse and dirndl skirt” (Schevy 28). In wearing Betsy’s clean, demure clothing home,
Esther attempts to re-identify with Betsy, who she had decided she most resembled. But,
she leaves Marco’s blood on her cheek: “I thought I would carry [the blood stains] around
with me, like the relic of a dead lover” (Plath 112-113). Boyer claims Esther “wants to be
noticed as one who has paid the price of sexual sisterhood—except that she is still a virgin”
(210). Affixing meaning to her experience without being physically maimed, Esther keeps
what Marco has “written” onto her, as a hysterical, semiotic, utterance of her trauma. This
blood signifies the price that Esther has not managed to pay with the blood her own hymen.
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Marco’s blood also might represent a “primitive life fluid” that isn’t semen, a failure to fully
rape (210). The remaining stain is first a marking by Marco, and a marking by Esther who
chooses not to wash it off. The mark both retains the perceived impurity of the racial and
heterosexual per Esther’s racist purity rituals and signifies physical proof that Esther has
been violated. Describing the blood as “relic of a dead lover” reflects Esther’s need to carry
something, some evidence of her trauma. Leaving the blood marking on her cheek reveals
that she no longer feels the white clean femininity she used to seek, that Betsy’s clothing is
a poor disguise and a failed identification. This scene is Esther’s first attempt to murder and
replace the ambivalent heterosexual identification with Marco.
From this point on, Esther begins to spiral. Continuing to wear Betsy’s skirt and
blouse, Esther refuses to wash and fails to sleep (Plath 127). Esther seeks to be consumed
by the other, trying and failing to attach an identification to Betsy by wearing her clothing,
similar to the case of the Russian translator. As her depression deepens, Esther finds she
cannot read and cannot write—"The letters grew barbs and rams’ horns. I watched them
separate, each from the other, and jiggle up and down in a silly way” (124). As symbolic
speech fails her and the semiotic goes unheard in the male structured linguistic world,
Esther presses further and further into complete silence. Her descent is brought to its
climax by the faulty electroshock therapy at the hands of her psychiatrist Doctor Gordon,
another domineering male figure. Like Marco, Doctor Gordon is a disjointing figure “who
confuses and mangles and veritably obliterates Esther’s identity” (Budick 879). The
electroshock therapy thus portrays a second rape. Esther describes the therapy in terms of
assault: “Then something bent down and took hold of me and shook me like the end of the
world… I wondered what terrible thing it was that I had done” (Plath 143). Esther’s
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language of self-blame signals a trauma response to the electroshock therapy. Anne
Cluysenaar believes that Plath’s writing bears the marking of “a typical survivor in the
psychiatric sense” of having weathered “extreme vulnerability to danger” (qtd. in WagnerMartin 63-64). While Cluysenaar means Plath writes as a survivor of suicide, the same logic
can be applied to Esther’s response to the painful electroshock therapy in terms. It is
language that correlates directly with Marco’s attack and bears the marks of the blame she
no doubt feels for suffering such an advance. The electroshock therapy can also be read as
trauma response also because it figures immediately before Esther begins to consider and
then act on suicidal urges.
The very next passage in the text outlines Esther’s first interest in suicide. Telling
her mother that she is “through with that Doctor Gordon,” Esther attempts to divulge her
pain through the semiotic speech of suicide. Each of Esther’s five suicide attempts
reference water: sea water, bath water, or womb water. The first time, Esther considers
slitting her wrists in the bath: “I thought it would be easy, lying in the tub and seeing the
redness flower from my wrists” (Plath 147). The second time, she visits the ocean she
frequented as a child: “A wave drew back, like a hand, and then advanced and touched my
foot… I waited, as if the sea could make my decision for me” (153). In the third, she thinks
of her grandmother’s house and boats: “I thought with longing of the house my
grandmother had before she sold it… and overhead beams thick as a ship’s timbers” (158).
In the fourth, she attempts to drown herself in the sea: “The water pressed in on my
eardrums and on my heart” (161). In the fifth, she sequesters herself in the womblike space
of her mother’s basement, where “A dim undersea light filtered through the slits of the
cellar windows” (168). The images of water in each attempt signal the pre-symbolic space
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of childhood, the semiotic. Literary critic Annis Pratt’s analysis in Archetypal Patterns in
Women’s Literature outlines the presence of natural imagery in healing from rape trauma.
Pratt theorizes that in classical literature and mythmaking, men are “agents of harsh
disruption” to the feminine space of nature, which signifies “freedom, solace, and
protection” (Pratt 25). Pratt references women in Greek myths turning into laurel trees,
reeds, or springs to escape rape (Pratt 25). Pratt also quotes Simone de Beauvoir, who
believes young girls “devote a special love to Nature: still more than the adolescent boy, she
worships it… it is her kingdom as a whole; when she takes possession of it, she also proudly
takes possession of herself” (362). For the young girl, nature thus becomes a space of
generative subjectivity. This is evidenced in one of Esther’s few references to her
childhood: “I felt happier than I had been since I was about nine and running along the hot
white beaches with my father the summer before he died” (Plath 75). The ocean and water
are sites of happiness and innocence for Esther.
Water also thus occupies the semiotic space of childhood through which Esther can
inscribe her trauma. Attempting to drown herself at the beach, Esther’s body speaks back
to her, asserting its own existence, “As I paddled on, my heartbeat boomed like a dull motor
in my ears. I am I am I am” (Plath 158). This insistence of the semiotic signals that Esther
must both move through death back to childhood semiotics, in order to re-learn the
symbolic and form proper identifications to replace the traumatic one with Marco. Like
identification in Totem and Taboo, Esther’s suicide attempts are simultaneously destructive
and constructive of latent heterosexual identification with Marco—whom she desires and
despises at the same time. The multiplicity of the attempts aligns with the repeated elegy of
identification—"Identification is itself an act of serial killing” (Fuss 93). Each suicide
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attempt, though failing to result in death, enacts a murder of the ambivalent identification in
its conjuring of Esther’s semiotic subjectivity. Generative of subjectivity through nature and
as semiotic speech, Esther’s suicide attempts thus move towards rebirth as well as death.
The “success” of Esther’s last suicide attempt in returning her to life is predicated
upon the two scenes just prior to it. First, Esther delivers flowers to a maternity ward while
volunteering at a local hospital. Esther notices “that a lot of flowers were droopy and
brown at the edges” and begins to pick out the dead ones, thinking that “it would be
discouraging for a woman who’d just had a baby to see somebody plonk down a big
bouquet of dead flowers in front of her” (Plath 162). Presented with women marked by
(supposedly consensual) sex, Esther rejects the wilted flowers as she rejects her own
tainted body. When the women object to the rearrangement of their flowers, Esther runs
from the hospital, directly (it seems), to the graveyard where her father is buried—
stopping only for new flowers. At her father’s grave, she sinks to the ground begins to cry:
“I laid my face to the smooth face of the marble and howled my loss into the cold salt rain”
(167). “Salt” is an unusual adjective for rain, it is a reference to tears, to the sea of Esther’s
childhood, and thus to her previous suicide attempts. Perhaps this is the same sort of rain
that doesn’t wash you clean (41). Henry Schevy makes the same connection: “water is also
associated with her father because of childhood memories” (33). However, his reading of
this scene relies on intertextuality and a Freudian perspective. Citing Plath’s poem “Daddy”
(1965), Schevy implies that Esther sexually desires her father, wishing “to entomb herself
alive” and join him in death (34). To push back against this reductively Oedipal analysis,
one might consider that Esther desires not her father but the feeling of being a child again.
Reading Esther’s howling as a verbalization allows for a reading like this to move away
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from the Oedipal and towards the identificatory, the semiotic. Esther has been unable to
express her suffering until this moment—"I can’t sleep, I can’t read” (Plath 126). She
discusses symptoms but cannot explain her pain or the trauma that has caused it.
Linguistics theorist Elaine Scarry, in The Body in Pain, asserts that, “Whatever pain
achieves, it achieves in part through its unsharability, and it ensures that unsharability
through its resistance to language” (4). Pain is un-sharable through the dominant discourse
of the human symbol system. It is sharable through the semiotic speech of the body, which
asserts itself through the childlike wailing of Esther at her father’s grave. Esther hasn’t felt
happy since before her father died and her family moved away from the ocean (Plath 150)
Faced again with her father, moving through suicides which generate attachment to water,
Esther reverts to the semiotic and manages to speak for the first time. This
acknowledgement thus permits Esther’s rebirth into a space of female identification—
moving away from the male, the Oedipal, the heterosexual.
The location of Esther’s final suicide attempt presents ample evidence for a move
towards the feminine. Taking sleeping pills, Esther sequesters herself in the small earthy
crawlspace in the basement of her mother’s house lit by a “dim undersea light” and sinks
into a watery sleep: “The silence drew off, baring the pebbles and shells and all the tatty
wreckage of my life. Then, at the rim of vision, it gathered itself, and in one sweeping tide,
rushed me to sleep” (Plath 169). The “undersea light” of the basement and the “sweeping
tide” which brings her into “sleep,” are all emblematic of womb water. This
characterization substantiates a reading of Esther’s final suicide attempt as a backwards
movement toward the semiotic, which Kristeva considers “a feminine and maternally
structured space” which “pre-dates the imposition of the (oedipal) sexual identity” (Grosz
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160). If ore-death is marked by Esther’s infantile wailing at her father’s grave like the
newborn crying in its father’s arms, Esther’s “death” is the insemination and birth into the
mental hospital. She first performs her own burial/conception in her mother’s
womb/basement, which E. Miller Budick considers “the ultimately fatal female retreat”
(877). Then, in her watery sleep she moves through the birth canal of the crawlspace and
emerges on the other end into the semiotic order of the hospital. This backwards birth
completes the destruction and integration of Esther’s identification with Marco, in
delivering Esther through vocalization of pain, rejection of the masculine symbolic
language, and into healing. As Schevy points out, Esther’s death drive is “not only a wish to
die but a wish to be unborn,” and that “she is very much in an analogous situation to a newborn child in that she too lacks an identity” (32). On the opposite side she will begin her
official developmental plot in the feminine space of the private hospital. As a space
comprised of only white women, the hospital operates by different rules. Esther is not only
able to take her first steps into the symbolic, but also properly into the queer. Esther’s
suicide/birth paves the way for new identifications with female characters, female spaces,
and female desire that will both allow for acknowledgement of her trauma and also replace
it.
Esther enters into the new world of her post-suicide attempt life incredulous of
others, but with a newfound boldness. In the city hospital, Esther’s association of men with
violence and deceit pushes through to the surface, “Some of them looked so young I knew
they couldn’t be proper doctors” (Plath 179). Female healing obviously cannot be
facilitated in a male dominated space, but at least Esther can now verbalize this and seek to
leave it. Additionally, the city hospital is inhabited by people of other races. This is where

38

the Black orderly appears, the only character who sees Esther for what she truly is, a “Miss
Mucky-Muck” (181). Ideologically his presence in the text is an intrusion. Kate Baldwin
compares this to Richard Nixon’s empty declaration of “diversity as equal to the abundance
of choice,” as actual diversity “would require opening selfhood to difference” (72-73).
Esther’s white supremacy prohibits such an opening. The exchange thus reveals Esther as
not only picky, but also unreservedly racist. Esther’s entry into the symbolic permits a full
rejection of men and heterosexual ideology, but it also facilitates Esther’s racism. Having
been re-birthed, Esther is now able to take the “’raw material’ of signification, the
corporeal, libidinal matter” of the semiotic, and harness it “for social cohesion and
regulation” (Grosz 151). Esther has re-connected with the semiotic, allowing a newfound
ability to vocalize feelings and needs for the better of her identification but the worse of her
racial tolerance. Esther begs her mother to help her “get out of here… You got me in here…
You get me out” (Plath 179). To Esther’s surprise, her mother agrees and delivers, proving
the power of her words and effective power of mirroring. Mrs. Greenwood enlists the help
of Philomena Guinea (the wealthy woman responsible for Esther’s scholarship to Smith),
who funds Esther’s transfer to a private hospital free of male doctors, elderly patients, and
minority orderlies. This signals the upward mobility of a white woman attuned to symbolic
language and dominant discourse, allowing Esther to mitigate her own healing by speaking
the right language.
In the private hospital, Esther finally enters the space of enclosed white femininity
where queer identifications can flourish. Nicholas Donofrio asserts that Esther’s private
hospital “appears very much like a women’s college” with its (white) “genteel names” and
residents who “roam the grounds, visit each other’s rooms, and read and talk about the
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latest issues of Vogue” (238). The comparison is apt, for women’s colleges both promote the
empowerment and confidence of their students and also tend to accrue rumors of
“lesbianism” occurring within their walls. Esther’s new female psychiatrist, Doctor Nolan,
operates as both a teacher and maternal mirroring entity. Emboldened by the positive
results from speaking up to her mother, Esther describes the electric shock therapy she
received from a male doctor before her suicide attempts began, “No, I didn’t like him at all…
I didn’t like what he did to me.’ ‘Did to you?’ I told Doctor Nolan about the machine, and the
blue flashes, and the jolting and the noise…” (Plath 189). This conversation reads as
Esther’s first verbal admission of disliking her assault. But it is still from a distance, because
while Esther has language for the pain of the electroshock therapy, she still does not
possess the term “date rape” or “sexual assault.” Still, the mere ability merely to disclose
this dislike reflects Esther’s movement away from desiring heterosexuality. Doctor Nolan
assures Esther ‘That was a mistake,’ she said then. ‘It’s not supposed to be like that” and
that her new electroshock treatments will be “like going to sleep,” drawing a connection to
Esther’s womb suicide (189). An identification with Doctor Nolan quickly replaces the
latent one with male harm-doers. E. Miller Budick argues that when Esther receives
electroshock therapy at the private hospital, Doctor Nolan “confirms Esther’s identity and
reestablishes her sense of self. She names Esther, repeating her name three times, and
speaks directly to her” (880). Esther’s identification with Doctor Nolan is more maternal
than desirous, but it mitigates the more sexually based female identifications in the clean,
feminine, and overwhelmingly white private hospital. It is Doctor Nolan who signs off on
Esther’s diaphragm and suggests the possible nurturance of female identifications: “I don’t
see what women see in other women,” Esther asks, “What does a woman see in a woman
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that she can’t see in a man?” (Plath 219). Doctor Nolan replies only, “Tenderness” (219).
Esther ultimately finds the greatest identification with Joan Giling, another white
girl at the private hospital—but one who Esther knew from before her hysteria. Joan grew
up in the same town as Esther, attended the same women’s college, and also dated Buddy
Willard. Notably, Joan presents a viable double for Esther because she is not so much an
‘other’ as a ‘self’, sharing so many of the same social positions of Esther (white, wealthy,
clean). Sylvia Plath wrote her own thesis at Smith on the presence of the double in
literature. Linda Wagner-Martin describes Plath’s discovery of the “psychological
necessity” of an ‘other,’ for the purpose of “recognizing within another the very traits one
might not want to recognize under self-scrutiny” (63). Which is why the presence of Joan is
so interesting, for not only does she mirror many of Esther’s identifying attributes, but she
is also attracted to women (Plath 218). Joan thus opens up the space for an identification, in
a way that Esther’s previously depicted friendships with other women could not. The
triangulation of Esther, Joan, and Buddy and would be ample enough evidence for a queer
reading even if Joan did not engage in sex with women. Buddy represents a crux between
the two women, the heterosexual object onto which Esther and Joan can affix queer desires
for one another. Eve Sedgwick discusses Réne Girard’s theory of homosexual triangulation,
which renders “the bond between two rivals in an erotic triangle as being even stronger,
more heavily determinant of actions and choices, than anything in the bond between either
of the lovers and the beloved” (708). In a story in Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams (1900) a
triangle of desire figures in the context of a supper party, in which a butcher desires his
wife’s friend. Freud reads the butcher’s wife as “a feminine-identified heterosexual” who is
only jealous of her husband’s desire (Fuss 31). Theorists such as Catherine Clément and
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Cynthia Chase have re-figured the story in different ways, but Fuss chooses to reimagine it
as one “of ‘between women,’ with the butcher, at most, a convenient identificatory relay for
a socially prohibited lesbian desire” (31). To read the triangle of Buddy, Joan, and Esther in
this way means a re-working of a classic Freudian reading of the jealous woman.
Joan first appears earlier in the text as the vehicle which delivers Buddy to Esther
when he stops by her dorm on the way to “the Sophomore Prom with Joan” (Plath 58). But
once Joan appears in the private hospital, Buddy fades away and a more nuanced
connection emerges between the women. Esther remarks that although she abhors Joan’s
homosexuality, she is fascinated with her. For Barbara Johnson, queerness between women
has more to do with “protracted an intense eye contact and involuntary re-encounters
ungrounded in conscious positive feelings” (162). This certainly holds with Joan. Esther
wonders if Joan, with her “pale, pebble eyes” would “continue to pop in at every crisis of my
life to remind me of what I had been through” (Plath 219). The text also figures Joan as a
distorted mirror, in which Esther can simultaneously recognize their differences and
similarities. It is in part what unconsciously draws Esther to Joan, “her thoughts were not
my thoughts, nor her feelings my feelings, but we were close enough so that her thoughts
and feelings seemed a wry, black image of my own” (219). Which is perhaps is what makes
Esther’s confusion about “what women see in other women” so humorous—for in Joan she
sees herself.
Esther’s queer identification with Joan at the private hospital also permits the
protracted fulfillment of Marco’s failed rape. Securing a diaphragm through shopping
privileges, Dowbnia reads Esther as free “from an unwanted relegation to the domestic
sphere,” now able to complete her de-flowering (586). The unusualness of these decisions,
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or their inherent queerness, should not go unnoticed. The cultural ideology of 1953 still
primarily viewed women as mothers, on the basis of what Nathan Stormer describes as an
“enduring pro-natal orthodoxy regarding maternity as woman’s telos” (346). In a
proposition at a secret Planned Parenthood conference on abortion in 1955, psychiatrist
and executive secretary of medical information at the New York Academy of Medicine Iago
Galdston “declared, ‘A woman is a uterus surrounded by a supporting organism’” (qtd. in
Stormer 346). Esther obviously disagrees, choosing instead to free herself from the threat
of pregnancy with birth control. The decision, aided by Doctor Nolan and the queer space of
the private hospital, places her external to dominant heterosexual ideology of the 1950s.
Esther uses the birth control to finally rid herself of her virginity by sleeping with a man
named Irwin by her own agency. Notably, Irwin is white. The intercourse itself is
heterosexual but fulfills a more symbolic than desirous purpose. Esther bleeds from the
penetration, but finally feels whole, “I couldn’t possibly be a virgin anymore… I felt part of a
great tradition” (Plath 229). This sexual encounter is the long-protracted fulfillment of the
rape and marking Esther was searching for following her experience with Marco. Marilyn
Boyer constitutes this bleeding as productive of “a body of writing” through the semiotic
language of her body (220). The “writing” produced by Esther’s hemorrhaging tells the
rape narrative that her body could not when she was initially assaulted. The injury is, after
all, described as “one in a million” by the male doctor who treats Esther (233). Though sex
with Irwin is literally heterosexual, it remains queer through Esther’s use of it to write her
own narrative.
This sexual experience is also queer in that it also leads Esther to back to Joan again,
who has since been released from the hospital and now lives in Boston. Esther arrives at
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Joan’s new apartment uncontrollably bleeding, expecting Joan to admonish her for her
extra-marital sex. Instead, Joan retrieves towels and takes care of Esther with that queer
“tenderness,” and Esther realizes that Irwin and the bleeding are just “a mere prick to her
pleasure at my arrival” (Plath 231). Like Buddy, Irwin is only a heterosexual vehicle
(mandated by 1950s ideology) required for Joan and Esther’s queer interaction. The scene
is by three counts significant: it is a protracted fulfillment of Esther’s rape, an extremely
physical interaction between the two women, and an effort to preserve life rather than to
end it. Linda Wagner-Martin alleges that by “giving Joan the problem of saving her life”
Esther completes identification with Joan, who “rather than being a copy of Esther, now
finds herself an original, the friend responsible for Esther’s very life” (69). Both women
bear the burden of Esther’s life and body as if belong to the both of them. In the emergency
room as the male doctor begins to “probe” Esther’s vagina, Joan stands by “rigid as a
soldier, at my side, holding my hand, for my sake or hers I couldn’t tell” (233). Joan’s
steadfastness in the hospital is significant as this sequence runs parallel to the assault
scene in New York. When after Marco’s attack Doreen disappeared from the country club
leaving Esther to slink home covering her “shoulders and bare breasts,” Joan remains
through the entire ordeal as Esther weathers the pain and embarrassment and a male
doctor handles her body (110). Through Joan’s tender physical attention, queerness
literally heals the violence of heterosexuality, reinforcing affection and identification
between the two women. Both Esther and Joan have a stake in the other, contradicting “the
sensationalized elements of lesbianism” by exemplifying that tenderness in “a novel, and
world, in which so few examples of that quality exist” (Wagner-Martin 68). The
relationship stands outside of 1950s heterosexual ideology, wherein women are pitted
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against one another in competition for men. Joan who loves women and wants to be a
psychologist and Esther who pursues casual sex with men and wants to be a writer, stand
outside the 1950s “the marriage-and-family machine” (Donofrio 221). As queer entities in a
heterosexual society, their identification promotes the development of both who might be
stunted alone.
Which is perhaps why it isn’t so shocking when Joan kills herself, just shortly after
the hemorrhaging episode. The text places the scene in the emergency room and Joan’s
death in close quarters which inevitably “suggests a cause-and-effect relationship”
(Wagner-Martin 69). Esther gravitates towards that suspicion immediately, but Doctor
Nolan pushes her away from. Doctor Nolan is correct. Joan’s suicide should be read as the
only viable means to which a queer relationship can be taken in a text set in 1953 and
bound by the ideologies of the time. In No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee
Edelman argues that “queerness exposes sexuality’s inevitable coloration by the [death]
drive” through its “rejection of spiritualization through marriage to reproductive futurism”
(27). If heteronormativity is fixed upon the issue of reproduction, and homosexuality is its
inverse, locating queerness in the gaps, the endings, and the failure of the marriage plot. As
having sex with Irwin finally completed Esther’s losing her virginity, Joan’s suicide
indicates a completion or fulfillment of Esther’s suicide. Joan takes her own life “in the
woods, by the frozen pond” (Plath 235). The locale is no accident, spectacularly mirroring
Esther’s suicidal movement towards nature. It also brings the return of Buddy, who seeks
to sneak himself back into the long-vanished triangle of desire. When he and Esther meet
again, she braces for lingering desire or emotion and instead feels “Nothing but a great,
amiable boredom” (238). Now that Buddy is excluded from the triangulation, Esther
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escapes the heterosexual complex of the fifties. Buddy asks Esther, “Do you think there’s
something in me that drives women crazy?” to which Esther laughs and responds, “You had
nothing to do with us, Buddy” (239-240). The marked used of “us” effectively cuts the
heterosexual out of the equation once and for all. Budick posits Joan’s death as Plath
“sealing off the lesbian option” and Esther wedding herself to the masculine world (883).
Perhaps Joan’s suicide closes off the potential for embodied lesbian sexuality, but it opens
up the space for the queer to flow into Esther’s development, set going by the queer climax
of death. Where Esther has previously approached desire for other women in terms of
being the one consumed (the Russian woman translator, Doreen’s bones, her mother’s
basement), this identification is a parallel exchange.
At the end of the novel, Esther prepares for her own release from the hospital and
she attends Joan’s funeral. Esther watches Joan’s casket being lowered into the earth and
reflects on the past six months—“I remembered the cadavers and Doreen and the story of
the fig tree and Marco’s diamond…” (Plath 237). Not only does she remember, but she
resists forgetting, citing the experiences as “part of me. They were my landscape” (237).
Esther has incorporated her traumas and experiences into a new subjectivity, new
landscape, new self, through the natural world which she returned to through her suicides.
This imagery is particularly potent as she watches her double’s entombment. Esther
wonders, “what I thought I was burying” (242). Overtly, Esther is burying herself by
burying her other, engaged Fuss’s assertion that “All active identifications, including
positive ones, are monstrous assassinations: the Other is murdered and… incorporated
before being entombed inside the subject” (Fuss 34). As Joan mitigated Esther’s protracted
sexual marking, as does Joan mitigate Esther’s “repetition and remembrance” of

46

identification (34). As a fulfillment of a queer narrative and identification in the context of
the 1950s, Joan’s burial represents the final consummation/consumption of identification.
In the site of the graveyard, now confronted with her double rather than the father,
Esther’s body once again speaks the language of the semiotic. Esther reflects on the flowers
by the grave, the lawns covered in pure white snow, and turns inward towards her body,
towards herself: “I took a deep breath and listened to the old brag of my heart. I am, I am, I
am” (Plath 243).
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Chapter II: Queer Inversions, Black Hollows in Toni Morrison’s Sula
“In many ways the Freudian paradigm implicitly depends on the presence of
the black female other. One of its more problematic aspects is that in doing
so it relegates black women’s sexuality to the irreducibly abnormal category
in which there are no distinctions between homosexual and heterosexual
women.”
Evelynn Hammonds, “Black (W)holes and the Geometry of Black Female
Sexuality”
Sula doubly depicts the displaced and de-centered bildungsroman along the axis of
race and gender. Literary critic and Morrison scholar, Pin-chia Feng warns that reading
Toni Morrison’s works as bildungsroman poses an “inherent risk” of allocating socially and
politically specific texts to a “quintessential western bourgeois (male) genre” (40). Not only
do the race and gender positions of Sula’s characters problematize its genre, but as well its
double protagonists do as well. Sula follows the development of two young Black women,
Nel Wright and Sula Peace. The literary double is an oft implemented trope, but also one of
“psychological necessity” in novels of development according to Linda Wagner-Martin (62).
Sula is not a story about two characters’ parallel developments, but a developmental plot
with two subjects: a “double bildungsroman” according to Feng. Nel and Sula grow in terms
of one another, inhabiting a dual selfhood integral to the subjective selves of each. Sula is
not the first novel to depict the double in a coming of age tale. But it is also not the first
novel about young Black women to depict the double. It is nonetheless a potent example of
a de-centered bildungsroman plotted along the lines of identification. Nel and Sula’s
doubling integrates and expands upon what Plath concluded in her undergraduate English
thesis on Fyodor Dostoevsky: “recognition of our various mirror images and reconciliation
with them will save us from disintegration” (qtd. in Wagner-Martin 63). As young Black
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women, Nel and Sula’s interdependent identification and doubling is more theoretically
provocative than that of Dostoevsky’s protagonists because of the significant trouble of
being a Black woman in the context of white American cultural ideology.
Identification is more critical, more fluidly examined, and more meaningful for the
two young Black protagonists of Sula. Diana Fuss, white woman, deals predominantly with
white narratives. But in the final chapter of Identification Papers, Fuss addresses the
colonial history of identification, drawing heavily from work by Caribbean psychiatrist and
philosopher Frantz Fanon. Her identification theory relies on Sigmund Freud’s conception
of self/other, a dichotomy which places Blackness inverse to whiteness. Fuss asserts that
“colonialism may inflict its greatest physical violence precisely by attempting to exclude
blacks from the very self-other dynamic that makes subjectivity possible” (142). The
colonized are required to maintain a position as a non-white as well as assimilate to a
white, European cultural norms at the same time. The Black subject in America is always
already other, stuck in a deadlock of “difference and similitude,” situated “at the vanishing
point of subjectivity” (146). Therefore, identification becomes paramount in constructing
selfhood for Nel and Sula. Scholar of Black feminist theory, Barbara Smith, reads the
bonding of Nel and Sula is an example of Black women’s bonding which has “always” taken
place “for the sake of barest survival” (139). Smith is the first to argue for the application of
a specific lens of critical theory and ideology to the writing of Black women. Smith believes
that both sexual and nonsexual relationships between women constitute a valuable aspect
of Black women’s literature (137). Finding solace in another who faces the same racial and
gender oppression is critical for the young Black female protagonist. When they first meet
as children, Nel and Sula have already discovered their othering: “they were neither white
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nor male” (Sula 52). To combat this, they “set about creating something else to be” through
identification with one another (52).
In Black women’s vernacular, the term girlfriend can refer to any close woman
friend or confidante whether platonic and sexual. The term is thus quite apt here for its
encompassment of a variety of female relationships. Kevin Everod Quashie indicates that
“the girlfriend is someone who makes it possible for a Black woman to bring all of herself
into consideration, to imagine herself wild and adventurous, but also safely and of the
shore” (190). The Black girlfriend (or playmate, sister, cousin) is she who understands in
sharing the same experience of oppression, the same axis of identity. Kyla Wazana
Tompkins, in “Intersections of Race, Gender, and Sexuality,” references the term “mati” in
the Surinamese language, which colloquially means “same-sex lover” but etymologically
comes from “the term ‘shipmate,’ as in ‘s/he who survived the middle passage with me’”
(175). One thinks of Zadie Smith’s characterization of adolescence as its own “middle
passage” in Swing Time (2016) (214). The girlfriend is a critical feature of Black women’s
writing and Black feminist theory. Deborah E. McDowell indicates that because “white
women, white men, and Black men consider their experiences as normative,” Black women
writers have been forced to make their own spaces in order to build subjectivity (168). The
Black girlfriend might be read as the very embodiment of Black feminist theory, a
necessary relationship in defining oneself outside of what is considered “normative” by
white supremacy and through sexism. Quashie maintains their relationship creates the
space for “a kind of ‘selfishness’,” in opposition to “the social imperative for Black women
to be selfless,” which allows for the fostering of their individual subjectivities (188). In
essence, friendship between Black women opens up a space for identifications specific to
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lived experience.
Some critics are content to read Sula in terms of platonic friendship. White lesbian
critic Barbara Johnson, referring somewhat facetiously to her “inner lesbo-meter,” feels
Sula “does not work” as a queer text for “while the relationship is certainly overinvested, it
is also abundantly explained” (162). For Johnson, the grounding of Nel and Sula’s need for
one another bars eroticism. Deborah McDowell also shies from a queer reading of the text,
believing a lesbian perspective on Sula is reductive of the novel’s “skillful blend of folklore,
omens, and dreams, its metaphorical and symbolic richness” (170). Alternately, critics such
as Kevin Everod Quashie (“The Other Dancer as Self: Girlfriend Selfhood”), Kathryn
Stockton (“Heaven’s Bottom: Anal Economics”), and famously Barbara Smith (“Toward a
Black Feminist Criticism”), maintain that Nel and Sula’s relationship is an inherently queer
one. Still others, such as that of Diane Gillespie and Missy Dehn Kubitschek, skirt the issue
entirely, directing the reader to the aforementioned Barbara Smith for “an interpretation of
Sula as a lesbian novel” (41-42). It is the position of this thesis to agree with the second
group. Although Sula and Nel’s relationship may not be explicitly homosexual, their intense
spiritual valences and resistance to heterosexual norms positions them as queer. Evelynn
Hammonds contends that because Black female queerness has been “doubly silenced,” it
must be located in the gaps in the text (129). Queerness pokes its head up in criticism of the
heterosexual or bolstering of female relationships. Morrison’s consistently cynical portraits
of heterosexual unions and emphasis on Nel and Sula’s relationship place Sula into the
theoretical space of the queer.
Queerness is also a necessary component of the self/other identification exchange.
Much of Fuss’s re-interpretation interrogates Freud’s claim that “desire for one sex is
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always secure through identification with the other sex,” mandating heterosexuality in
order to keep the two terms separate (11). A rigid gender binary thus forms the theoretical
“lynchpin” between Freud’s homosocial and homosexual behaviors. By Freud’s contention,
confusion of identification with desire results in homosexual desire. Freud prescribes his
female patient in “Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality,” with the confused
identification outlined by Fuss as: “wanting to be a mother” vs. “wanting to have a mother”
(62). Freud still portrays desire for the mother in heterosexual terms as a latent Oedipal
desire for the father. But surprisingly, Freud also determines that this study indicates a
“considerable measure of latent or unconscious homosexuality” in all “normal people” (qtd.
in Fuss 62). This conclusion contradicts Freud’s usual theory and concedes that
homosexuality may be more linked to identification than he reports. Fuss enters the text at
this strange concession to detail her belief that the psychological experience of
identification and desire “cannot be securely separated or easily prevented from turning
back on one another” (77). In other words, Fuss believes that all identifications are
inherently desirous. Therefore, interpreting Sula through the lens of identification rests on
reading Nel and Sula as queer characters.
Queering Nel and Sula also supports rendering identification within and decentering the trajectory of Nel and Sula’s dual development. Reading their relationship as
queer also has theoretical use in untangling the fraught territory of Black women’s
sexuality. As Kyle Wazana Tompkins reveals “to be black” in the context of American
history of chattel slavery, is “to be always already sexualized… and therefore to be always
and already deviant” (174). This designation victimizes all Black Americans, but in
particular it hinders the sexual agency of Black women through hegemonic objectification.
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Evelynn Hammonds, scientist and scholar of African American feminism, discusses how
white American ideology has always “already colonized” Black women’s bodies; a body
which “has so much sexual potential that it has none at all” (129). Ideology perceives the
Black American woman’s body as the “embodiment of sex,” silencing her individual sexual
agency (129). Hammonds calls for a more holistic engagement of Black feminist sexuality,
foregrounding the positive and pleasurable, and locating queerness for Black women as a
site “where black female desire is expressed” (132). Queerness thus constructs a space of
discursive sexuality free from sexism and white supremacy. Critics often view Nel and Sula
as opposites and Sula as a text about women’s differences. Marie Nigro characterizes Sula
as “the impulsive, emotional one” and Nel as frigid: “the practical one” (727). Similarly, Pinchia Feng remarks that “Nel regards herself as a ‘good’ black woman since she abides
faithfully by the values of her community. Sula, on the other hand, resists conformity and
questions this arbitrary division” (79). It is tempting to read figures of the double through
Angel/Devil, Virgin/Whore dichotomies. But there is little nuance to categorically
difference Sula and Nel. A queer reading assuages this tension by pairing Nel and Sula
together as two interdependent agents who borrow and reject pieces of one another.
Queerness in Sula is established via the erotic natural imagery of the Bottom. Nel
and Sula meet in dreams before ever connecting in the real world. Isolated only daughters
of absent fathers and distant mothers, both imagined “a presence, a someone, who, quite
like the dreamer, shared the delight of the dream” (Sula 51). Both girls hope for an erotic
“someone” to confide in. Nel dreams of a “fiery prince,” Sula images herself “on a gray-andwhite horse” (51, 52). Each wish for someone who will fill the empty spaces of her lonely
childhood. Lorraine Bethel reads an inherent “sensuality in their interactions” (qtd. in B.
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Smith 139). Morrison’s dewy language encourages eroticism and situates Nel and Sula’s
“wish” for the other as closer to desire. Nel and Sula’s meetings all take place in a
summertime “limp with the weight of blossomed things” (Sula 56). In the summer of 1922,
they discover adolescent heterosexuality together—“the summer of the beautiful black
boys” (56). On “the second Saturday in June” in 1927, Nel gets married and Sula leaves the
Bottom for ten years (84). When Sula returns to Medallion as an adult in 1937, Nel
describes the particular “sheen” of the spring, “a glimmering as of green, rain-soaked
Saturday nights… of lemon-yellow afternoons bright with iced drinks and splashes of
daffodils” (94). Annis Pratt, in Archetypal Patterns in Women’s Fiction believes that nature
figures prominently in the development of the young female protagonist: “Visions of her
own world within the natural world, or naturistic epiphanies, channel the young girl’s
protests into a fantasy where her imprisoned energies can be released” (17). Nature and
summer are integral characteristics of Nel and Sula’s identification. The natural returns
when they reunite in adulthood, signaling that despite the ten years of absence, their
identification persists. Pratt also specifies the eroticism of nature, identifying the figure of
Eros or the “green-world lover” who inhabits the childhood realm of the natural (16). For
Nel and Sula, this is an apt characterization. But Pratt’s work is outdated and insufficient in
that she fails to include any significant attention to race in her work.
Vashti Crutcher Lewis, in “African Tradition in Toni Morrison’s Sula,” reads Sula in
terms of West African river worship. Lewis’s interpretation provides a race specific reading
of nature to satisfy the shortcomings of Pratt’s text. She proposes that in bearing
ontological connections to local madman and pariah, Shadrack, Sula maintains a “spiritual
presence in nature” as the figure of an African river goddess (95). Shadrack is a shell-
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shocked veteran of WWI who makes his living as a fisherman by the river. Lewis makes
several comparisons which link Shadrack to a nature-based African spirituality. West
African river spirits “are said to look like men but their feet and hands are different” (93).
When Shadrack appears at the beginning of the text, he has difficulty controlling his hands,
which “grow in a higgledy-piggledy fashion” and shrink down again (Sula 9). They are only
calmed when he finds his reflection and his “grave black face” in the water of a toilet bowl
(13). Not only does this scene reinforce Shadrack’s connection to water, but it introduces
mirroring and comfort in Blackness as integral to identification in the text. Sula and
Shadrack’s connection manifests during a scene at the river. Nel and Sula play digging holes
with a fervor akin to orgasm, “they stroked the blades up and down… she grew impatient
and poked her twig rhythmically and intensely into the earth… together they worked until
the two holes were one and the same” (Sula 58). Replicating each other’s the movements,
Nel and Sula penetrate the earth individually but in tandem with one another, until their
holes are one and the same. This ecstatic mirroring expresses both identification and queer
desire. Ronnie Scharfman’s colloquial outline of Lacanian theory details that the structure
of mirroring is based upon “the ‘regard,’ and its analogues, such as echo, reflection, or
dream” (90). “Regard” is what makes existence conceivable, for an “other” to mirror the
movements of the “self” is to prove that the “self” is moving in the first place—and
therefore exists. Kevin Everod Quashie reads the scene as a “surrender to the girlfriend: a
meeting of one’s (other) self at the river” (193). Nel and Sula meet one another as the self,
melding their holes together.
Following the digging play, Nel and Sula begin to play with another, younger child
named Chicken Little. Sula swings him around by the arms, until he “slipped from her
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hands and sailed away over the water” sinking underneath the surface of the river as Nel
watches (Sula 60). Frozen with fear, both girls notice that Shadrack has been watching. Sula
rushes over to his shack, where Shadrack consoles Sula with just the word “always,” the
answer to “a question she had not asked” (63). Eighteen years later on Sula’s deathbed, the
prophecy is fulfilled as she dreams of water and wonders, “Who was it that had promised
her a sleep of water always?” (149). The structuring of the death of Chicken Little alongside
the first meeting of Sula and Shadrack, and this prophetic sleep of water, further outlines
the West African religious valences of Vashti Crutcher Lewis’s argument. Lewis reads
Chicken Little’s drowning a sacrifice: “it was not uncommon for children to be sacrificed to
the river gods in Africa, throughout the Bight of Benin” (93). Sula and Shadrack’s meeting
immediately following his death further construct the scene as a sacrificial one. It is the
moment that Shadrack acknowledges Sula as a fellow water spirit, with whom he has a
“spiritual marriage and kinship,” reminding her that she too will face a death by water (93).
The characterization of Chicken Little’s death as a spiritual sacrifice grounded in nature,
contributing to a queer reading of the scene. For although Lewis’s reading structures itself
around Sula and Shadrack, Nel is also an agent in Chicken Little’s death. Chicken Little’s
interruption of Nel and Sula’s mirrored, erotic digging leads to his murder: “an unspeakable
restlessness and agitation held them. At the same instant each girl heard footsteps in the
grass” (59). Chicken Little serves as a heterosexual intruder, portending the maternal roles
that lie in wait for the girls if they veer from a queer path. In “Dead Boys and Adolescent
Girls,” Pamela Thurschwell quotes Lisa Williams, who believes that that Chicken Little’s
death buries “the encroaching adult emphasis on heterosexual relations as opposed to
female friendship” (121). In retaliation, Nel and Sula ritually sacrifice Chicken Little to the
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river.
The queer space of the Bottom also mitigates Nel and Sula’s identification. The town
rests on the premise of inversion. White farmers tricked the original inhabitants of the
Bottom into settling the less fertile hilltop by calling it “the bottom of heaven,” prompting
the townspeople to nickname the community “the Bottom in spite of the fact that it was up
in the hills” (Sula 4). The Bottom, more neighborhood than town, is a haven of Blackness,
where Black assumes the unmarked category and the white gaze is geographically
inverted: “every day they could literally look down on the white folks” who lived in the
valley (5). The Bottom’s downward mobility as a Black working class community also
incites a gender inversion. Kathryn Bond Stockton, in her text “Heaven’s Bottom: Anal
Economics and the Critical Debasement of Freud in Toni Morrison’s Sula,” reads the Bottom
in a position of anality based on the incompatibility of American capitalism with its Black
“Bottom” class. Stockton theorizes that the white American capitalist state’s preclusion of
Black men from prototypically male employment engenders emasculation as well as the
regressive economics of the Bottom. Black men are passed over for manual labor and
emasculated by service jobs, like Nel’s eventual husband Jude Green—“a waiter hanging
around a kitchen like a woman”—Black women have always been able to find work (Sula
82). The Black men of the Bottom (and throughout America) are denied access to white
male masculinity through labor. In contrast, white economics afford Black women plentiful
employment opportunities in domestic labor. Unlike the privatized domestic duties of the
average mid-century white woman, Black women “have been blocked from (the bourgeois
ideal of) white feminine passivity” and consistently “tied to production circuits in dominant
economies” (Stockton 95). Black women are denied access to constructions of white female
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femininity. Stockton contends that through this reversal, “Morrison’s black women become
the anal penetrators of the novel’s black men” (88). Characterizing women as penetrating
men is strikingly queer against the ideology of white, heterosexist society. The Bottom thus
becomes an upside down, queer space. The domestic spaces of the Bottom are femaleheaded, positioning Black women on “top” in the anal metaphor of Stockton. The power
structures of white gender fail in Black communities; excluding Black men and women
from the heterosexual narrative of white ideology and constructing the Bottom as queer.
The Bottom represents, with devastating precision, how Black families “fail” to fit
into the American capitalist paradigm of heterosexual family structure. Many ethnographic
studies, such as the 1965 Moynihan Report, have presented the idea that “strong black
women make black men weak,” blaming Black women for oppressing their men and Black
men for not oppressing their women (Stockton 97). A Black household headed by a woman
is seen as feminizing, debasing, and “proof” of a failure to be upwardly mobile. But Black
masculinity in Morrison’s novels says something different, portraying Black men as “bodies
who wear (in the sense of genital as clothes) the failed promise of a dominant sign” (98).
Promised the gender supremacy of being male but denied that position because of their
race, Black men are let down over and over again by white heterosexual ideals. Promised
gainful, non-debasing employment by American culture and given nothing, Black
masculinity looks like femininity because it is set up to fail. Black men as well as Black
women become queered in the absence of their promised gender destinies—composing the
Bottom as queer space. Morrison posits the Bottom as an “alternate, anal economy,”
outside of the “white capitalist complex,” where the downwardly mobile, the queer, fixation
on the anal, seems to be the key to identification (85). The citizens of the Bottom are
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required to fit into a white American standard of masculinity and femininity by a white
capitalist economy but barred from entry by the same ideology. The Bottom becomes a
queer space, outside of the white, heterosexual nation-state which Tompkins believes to
both produce and obscure “populations of color as always and already nonheteronormative and sexually deviant” (177). Dominant ideology will always perceive the
incompatibility of Black men and women with the formations of white, capitalist,
heterosexual citizenship as deviant.
The Bottom, with its alternative anal economy and “regressive” Black men, per
white capitalist standards produces a queer Black society outside of prescribed norms. The
Bottom is both within Medallion and within capitalist America, but also external to it. As a
space of queer non-existence, it provides the perfect site for the growth of Black female
queerness. Evelynn Hammonds, feminist scholar and physicist, describes Black lesbian
sexuality in terms of a black hole: an “empty place in space” which is actually “dense and
full” (128, 133). Because Black female queerness is silenced by ideology and so often
invisible in text, its discernment relies on reading what circles around it. In agreement with
Stockton’s theory, this stages the Bottom as a space which fosters Black female queerness,
and therefore identification. The Bottom is literally collapsing. Stockton illustrates this
through the downward movement of the town, when the Black community literally moves
down the hill and the “white rich folks from the valley move up” (85). Where a black hole’s
collapse results from the darkness of space absorbing the light of a star, the Bottom
collapses in the opposite color direction; white gentrification replacing a Black community.
Karin Luisa Badt invokes the opening of the novel which describes the literal uprooting of
the Bottom: “Where they tore the nightshade and blackberry patches…” (Sula 3). Badt
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holds that rootlessness results from “racist oppression” and the downward mobility of the
Bottom results from “racist politics” (569). The displacement of the Bottom operates as a
second colonization. The Bottom is a void space, a doubly-silenced by the white
heteronormative suburbs which replace it. Figured as a black hole, it is also a physical
manifestation of Black female queerness which allows the theoretical space for Nel and
Sula’s identification.
At first as children, a great deal of their identification relies on each other’s families.
Both girls find “in each other the intimacy they were looking for” and what was missing
from their home lives (Sula 52). Diane Gillespie and Missy Dehn Kubitschek assert that Nel
and Sula provide what the other “the lacks in their mother-daughter relationships” (40).
Nel provides Sula, with a center, and Sula provides Nel with expansiveness. Identification is
not so simple, however. As each girl grows older, she must reckon the identifications with
her maternal ancestors. Nel and Sula’s relationship facilitates confrontation of the sexual
politics and generational traumas of their female ancestors. But at the same time, latent
familial identifications threaten the queer one between the girls. In Identification Papers,
Diana Fuss details the story of a group of sons murdering and then cannibalizing their
father from Freud’s Totem and Taboo (1913) (32). Fuss uses the narrative to illustrate the
repetitive violence of the murder and then the incorporation of “multiple and contradictory
identifications” (34). To incorporate an identification with an object (in particular a
parental figure) that the subject both loves and hates, identification must be repeated over
and over again.
In Sula, this manifests in Nel and Sula’s relationships with their mothers and
grandmothers. Louise Bernikow, in Among Women, asserts that Sula “is not a novel about
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the viciousness of women. It is, instead, about not knowing, about the ways women deny
their love for one another, within the family and between friends” (55). This is true, but
Bernikow pays little notice to the specificities of Nel and Sula’s cultural political contexts
which coerce the denial of love. It is not a novel about female viciousness, it is a novel about
a world where Black women must perpetuate viciousness and negotiate their love both for
one another and themselves. While it may be true, as Pin-Chia Feng reasons that “the
repetition of the maternal discourse sets up an important network of relations as well as
limitations for the self-creation of a woman of color,” it is also easy to mis-read this (81).
Relationships between female family members in Sula are indeed critical to the selfcreation of Nel and Sula and dependent on the social context of all the characters. But it
would be remiss to fall into an analysis that characterizes the limitations of those
relationships as malicious, nefarious, or anything other than political. Gillespie and
Kubitschek point to Morrison’s consistent work on how “the results of mother-daughter
relationships damaged by racism and poverty” (29). Though attempting to criticize the
racist context in where it occurs, Gillespie and Kubitschek (both white), end up
characterizing Nel and Sula and their community as a whole as reductively “broken.” In
suggesting that Morrison constructs “mother-daughter relationships damaged by racism
and poverty” but at the same time positioning Helene as a middle-class mother who “feeds
on her child,” Gillespie et al. present a racist reading with little basis in actual historical
paradigms of oppression (31).
The ideological and social context of Black women in America in the 1940s makes it
quite difficult for either Eva Peace or Helene Wright to both be breadwinners and nurturing
mothers. As Kathryn Bond Stockton indicates in “Heaven’s Bottom,” the signifier of a
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successful Black family is measured “by the extent to which they reverse Bottom gender
and mime white families” (96). The political grounding for this lies in the philosophy of the
Black Baptist Women’s Movement’s “respectability.” Created post-reconstruction, the
movement emphasized methods by which Black women might gain the same respect as
white women. In Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham’s canonical text, Righteous Discontent: The
Women's Movement in the Black Baptist Church: 1880-1920, the “religious-political
message” takes from “biblical teachings, the philosophy of racial self-help, Victorian
ideology, and the democratic principles of the Constitution of the United States” (186). In
essence, if Black women were able to attain the aspirations of the white middle-class, they
would assimilate into white American culture and secure economic stability and bodily
safety. The Black Baptist women’s movement intended respectability as a strategy that
would allow “black women to counter racist images and structures” (187). The concept is
fraught, for in attempting to secure the (often physical) safety of Black women in a racist
society, the movement “condemned what they perceived to be negative practices and
attitudes among their own people” and preached “blacks’ conformity to the dominant
society’s norms of manners and morals” (187). For in essence, respectability was based
upon a principle denoting that the Black middle class was effectively worthier of respect
and humane treatment than the working class. With this in mind, Brittney C. Cooper asserts
that respectability politics emerge “as a reasonable, though not particularly laudable,
approach to protecting the sanctity of Black women’s bodies” (15). So, while Helene
Wright’s middle-class aspirations may stifle Nel and promote heteronormativity, her
intentions lie in securing the safety of both herself and her daughter. Further, although Eva
and Hannah’s easy sexuality may seem to be the less repressive of the offered routes, both
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women also fulfill heterosexual narratives.
For the processes of identification in Sula, either girl replicating the heterosexuality
of her mother also results in the halt of queer identification. As Ronnie Scharfman indicates,
“the mother figure represents the first external mirror, eventually internalized, into which
a girl-child looks to discover her identity”—but she need not be the last (89). The queer
girlfriend demonstrates the second external mirror. As Evelynn Hammonds implores the
reader of the queer text to look for the void, so shall this reading emphasize the missing
space in the novel (129). Sula spans a total of forty-six years, beginning when Sula and Nel
are nine and ending when Nel is fifty-five. The first of the gaps appears between 1927 and
1937, when Sula moves away from the Bottom. One can read this “black hole” as a queer
one through its bookending scenes: Nel’s wedding to Jude and Sula’s return. Just as Nel and
Jude prepare to leave the wedding and consummate their marriage, Sula departs the
Bottom: “When she raised her eyes to him for one more look of reassurance, she saw
through the open door a slim figure in blue, gliding, with just a hint of a strut, down the
path toward the road” (Sula 85). Pamela Thurschwell describes Nel’s wedding as “a joyful
one, even if it prefigures a kind of death” (125). The narrative leaves off in a ten-year death,
revived only once Sula returns in an effervescent spring. Nel’s wedding to Jude Green also
indicates “Nel’s halting movement toward whiteness,” as characterized by Stockton (102).
The text explains the strangeness of a “real wedding, in a church, with a real reception
afterward” in the context of the Bottom (Sula 80). Although it is not difficult to read
heterosexuality into a wedding between a man and a woman, Nel’s wedding signals the
climax of all of Helene’s white middle class aspirations. In Beyond Respectability, Brittney C.
Cooper indicates that “in the American heteronormative context, heterosexual acts
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between consenting white parties have historically been viewed as the most appropriate”
manner in which to engage sexually (109). Therefore, the whiteness of Nel’s marriage
allows her to cross over the threshold of the middle class, denying the Black female
queerness of her childhood.
The event shatters both Nel and Sula’s friendship and as well the identification
process. Kevin Everod Quashie reads this in the image of Sula walking out the door at the
wedding, seeing the figure as a woman who may be neither Nel nor Sula but a “third
woman” who “represents Nel’s union with Sula,” whose departure functions as “a casualty
of the marriage” (194). The woman is not Sula, nor is it Nel, but a symbol of their dual self.
She is the embodiment of their queer desire and identification. It is critical that this third
woman leaves at the moment Nel severs identification with Sula by turning to the
heterosexual instead. Nel’s relationship with Jude does not work as identification, for its
basis in Jude’s gender suffering. As domestic labor at the local hotel debases his
masculinity, Jude marries Nel to soothe his wounded ego by seeking sympathy and
bolstering of his self. Marie Nigro indicates that “with Nel, he would be complete… So Nel
joins with Jude to once again merge herself with another” (728). Nel agrees to marry Jude
by the temptation of being seen as a single person rather than one half of a set. But seduced
away from identification with Sula, she is enveloped entirely into a heterosexual
relationship which promotes the subjectivity of Jude rather than the two together. Nel and
Sula’s girlhood double cannot persist “in the face of social imaginations,” like heterosexual
relationships which “that intend to limit Black women’s right to willful self(ish)ness”
(Quashie 208). Marrying Jude returns Nel to the ideologically mandated selflessness that
Nel and Sula’s identification surpassed. Quashie alleges that through marriage, “Jude
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literally becomes a disruption of Nel’s process of self-reflection” (194). The black hole, to
speak to Hammonds’ theory, created by the ten years of missing narrative after Nel’s
wedding thus engenders the disappearance of the queer.
On the opposite side of the narrative gulf, Sula returns to the Bottom in May of 1937.
The narrator describes the spring of Sula’s return in terms of the verdant summers of Nel
and Sula’s youth: “It had a sheen, a glimmering as of green, rain-soaked Saturday nights… of
lemon-yellow afternoons bright with iced drinks and splashes of daffodils… the riversmoothness of their voices” (Sula 94). Sula and Nel once again meet in spring, indicated the
supposed return of identification. Unaware that Nel has truly strayed from the path, Sula
holds fast to the identification. This reading helps to explain why Sula chooses to seduce
Jude. If Sula still identifies with Nel, sleeping with Jude is an expression of Sula’s desire for
Nel, rather than a betrayal of her best friend. In her book Between Men, Eve Sedgwick
discusses the homosocial and male homosexual desire expressed through triangle
relationships. Sedgwick draws from René Girard, who sees “the bond between two rivals in
an erotic triangle as being even stronger, more heavily determinant of actions and choices,
than anything in the bond between either of the lovers and the beloved” (708). Fuss uses a
version of this theory to re-purpose triangulation in Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams
(1900) along similar queer lines. In the story, Freud presents an example of adulterous
desire is played out at a supper party, where a butcher lusts after his plump wife’s thin
friend. Freud interprets the wife’s jealousy of her friend as a protracted desire for her
husband (Fuss 28). Fuss interprets the identification/desire triangle through a queer lens
(one that Freud avoids), “The drama of triangulated desire involves more than a case of
heterosexual jealousy, wherein “the wife’s identification with her husband’s desire opens
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up a space for a forbidden homoerotic object-choice” (29). Believing via identification that
she is Nel, Sula assumes a desire for Jude. Jude becomes a mere vehicle; “a convenient
identificatory relay for a socially prohibited lesbian desire” (31). This would explain why
Sula cannot understand why Nel views her actions as betrayal. Sula cannot fathom why
Jude couldn’t be shared as they had shared all things, which is why she “was ill prepared for
the possessiveness of the one person she felt close to” (Sula 119). Rather than re-form
desire for Sula, Nel rejects her a second time. Because Nel has figured an identification with
Helene and her middle class, heterosexual politics, she has halted her identification with
Sula. In grief for Jude, Nel shuts herself into the bathroom in her house and waits “for the
oldest cry. A scream not for others, not in sympathy for a burnt child, or a dead father, but a
deeply personal cry for one’s own pain” (108). But no such cry arrives, because the cry is
not for Jude at all—it is for the loss of Sula. The cry instead takes the form of a gray ball,
“just to the right of her, in the air, just out of view,” which follows her until the end of the
novel—for as long she denies identification with Sula (108). It seems that fulfilling an
identification with Helene, or with the white middle class, also means a life of isolation.
Sula also fulfills an identification with her mother in this scene, if a half-formed one.
Hannah Peace, though long dead, was a woman who “could break up a marriage before it
had even become one” (Sula 44). After the incident and Nel’s rejection, Sula begins to
search for a new identification, “to fill up the emptiness,” as Marie Nigro describes it (730).
Sula turns to the heterosexual politics of her maternal forbearer. Like Hannah once did,
Sula begins to sleep with the married men of the Bottom. But when Hannah slept with
married men, the wives “never gossiped,” taking her interest in their husbands as a
compliment (Sula 44). When Sula sleeps with the Bottom’s husbands, the wives cast her out
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and accuse her of doing “the unforgivable thing” of sleeping with white men (112).
Therefore, Sula’s heterosexuality is an inaccurately replicated identification with her
mother. Hannah was generous with her love-making, she “had respected the ways of the
community” (Nigro 730). Sula’s inability to properly identify with Hannah stems from her
lingering queer identification with Nel. Quashie proposes that the Black girlfriend “offers a
rare opportunity for that Black woman to be selfish” (190). Identification is the very
process of being self-ish, finding a self in someone else and keeping that self for one’s own.
Unlike the “possessiveness” of heterosexual marriage, identification is for the mutual
benefit of both, the individual selfish desires of both actors in the identification. Therefore,
Barbara Smith’s suggestion that Sula’s heterosexual engagements remain queer rings even
more true: she “uses men for sex which results, not in communion with them, but in her
further delving into self” (141). The pleasure that Sula finds within her heterosexual
encounters is a selfish endeavor for her own enjoyment. Which would explain Sula’s failure
to replicate Hannah—who always made sure her male partners felt “complete and
wonderful just as he was” (Sula 43). Although Sula has sex with men, her desire and
experiences remain female-centered, self-centered, and therefore queer.
Which would explain why possessiveness, when Sula finds it, results in death. When
she first loses Nel, Sula claims to have “no intimate knowledge of marriage, having lived in a
house with women who thought all men available” (Sula 119). More so than Nel’s love for
Jude, she cannot understand the possessiveness that bars Sula from the relationship and
from Nel. “Possessiveness” has the operative power of switching a queer approach to sex
with men to a heterosexual one. With the power structures in place, Gillespie and
Kubitschek theorize that loving men “requires a giving of one’s self and a ‘selfless’ effort to
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experience with the other” (44). So, while Sula’s undiscerning sexual encounters with the
husbands of the Bottom remain queer, the relationship she forms with Ajax becomes
heterosexual once she begins to feel possessive of him. But the relationship first reads as
queer. Unlike Jude, Susan Neale Mayberry believes that Ajax “is simply not interested in
learning about the community values of marriage and fidelity” (528). Ajax is one of the only
men in the Bottom secure in his masculinity, comfortable in the queer inversions of the
community. He is comfortable in the rootlessness of life in the Bottom because he has no
designs on white middle class upward mobility: “Historically, African American men have
had no land, held no dominion; moving is what they do” (527). Ajax likes Sula because of
her queer approach to sexuality. In their lovemaking, Sula describes digging through the
“gold” and “alabaster” and “loam” of Ajax’s face (Sula 130). Stockton interprets this as an
anal discourse on Sula and Ajax’s sexual behavior, “her rubbing and scraping and chiseling
and swallowing surely color her active in intercourse” (111). In this queer version of
sexuality, identification is possible. But Stockton reaffirms that this cannot last in the
context of white heterosexual ideology, for “coupledom signals a ‘paradigm that just
doesn’t work’” in the context of Black economies—no matter how queer the heterosexual
couple may be (98). As Nel became maternal figure to Jude, Ajax suspects Sula to be
“brilliant, like his mother” (Sula 128). Sula sinks into the role of selfless caretaker, losing
the selfishness she cultivated with Nel and through her queered heterosexual encounters.
Which is why, when Sula implores him to “Come on. Lean on me,” Ajax runs for the hills
(133). Abandoned for the second time, Sula gives up on replacing Nel and accepts death as
the only conclusion to her narrative.
Ajax’s departure facilitates the final earthly meeting between Nel and Sula at Sula’s
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sickbed. The two are estranged but still the meeting bears the mark of desire through its
natural imagery. While talking to Nel, Sula thinks of “the wind pressing her dress between
her legs as she ran up the bank of the river to the four leaf-locked trees and the digging of
holes in the earth” (Sula 146). The presence of nature and this callback to their childhood
mirroring indicates that identification persists between Nel and Sula. Despite the
heterosexual interventions and narrative gaps, the two girls remain linked. Rita A.
Bergenholtz asserts that Nel decides to visit Sula in this scene on the grounds of being “the
forgiving Christian woman” (92). Even faced with Sula’s death, Nel maintains a strict
adherence to Helene’s respectability. She alludes that the men who have left them would
have been worth keeping, to which Sula responds “They ain’t worth more than me” (Sula
143). This is both a token of both her commitment to self, but a commitment to Nel as well,
who is after all another dimension of Sula. For the meeting functions as a release for Sula,
who finds herself able to sink into death when Nel leaves. Pin-chin Feng believes that in
death, Sula “engages in her final step of creating me-ness,” as Morrison paints Sula curled in
the fetal position in Eva’s bed, in the “imagery of rebirth” (88). More so than me-ness, it is a
death of profound identification. Sula sinks into that “sleep of water” promised by Shadrack
in her youth, “down, down until she met a rain scent and would know the water was near,”
and remarks, “Wait’ll I tell Nel” (Sula 149). The presence of water links Sula back to
Shadrack and to Vashti Crutcher Lewis’s characterization of both as “water spirits,”
wherein her death brings her back “into the spirit world” (94). By hoping to share the unsharable—birth and death—Sula reaches out once more to Nel with the most transcendent
of identifications. Returning to the waters of the river, Sula returns to the mirror play of the
girls’, to the first heterosexual intervention in the text of Chicken Little (Sula 59). Morrison
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effectively constructs both a culmination of identification as well as a beginning, implying
that Sula will be waiting for Nel on the other side of life to begin their joint development
once more.
Without Sula, the Bottom begins to collapse into itself. As the community’s most
vocal and vibrant representation of queer desire has been silenced, the town crumbles. In a
chaotic scene, the novel culminates in a sort of communal suicide, fulfilling the anal
discourse of the Bottom’s name. On Shadrack’s final National Suicide Day the inhabitants of
the Bottom become the anal penetrators of the earth as they dance into the abandoned
tunnel beneath the river that was meant to link the Bottom to the rest of Medallion: “They
didn’t mean to go down into the lip of the tunnel, but in their need to kill it all, all of it…
they went too deep, too far…” (Sula 161-162). As the tunnel collapses, each and every one
of the dancers die. Stockton believes this moment depicts the rage of the Bottom’s
inhabitants “at their own enforced downward mobility” leading them to “attack the tunnel
that figures their relationship to white employment promises” (112). After all, it is this
tunnel that promised a properly masculine vocation for the Bottom’s Black men and failed
them. This final queer penetration of the earth by the people of the Bottom is analogous to
the final collapsing of the Bottom into Evelynn Hammonds’ black holes of Black lesbian
desire—a pleasure discourse on the agency of Black people that has previously “gone
under-analyzed” (Hammonds 130).
The group suicide is also an identification act on the part of the Bottom. Literary
critic Katy Ryan believes that suicide, in Morrison’s texts, operates as “an organizational
axis around which meanings revolve—a break in textual time” (390). Ryan also confers
that Black communities resist talking about suicide in explicit terms, because of a
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“reluctance to identify oneself or one’s community with victimization, powerlessness,
hopelessness” (391). Shadrack’s National Suicide Day emerges at the beginning of the novel
and remains invisible until its final celebration. National Suicide Day embodies the
“revolutionary suicide” that Ryan talks about because it makes Shadrack’s private trauma
public. This suicide in particular, the final and most successful of the National Suicide Days,
enfolds itself into the text as an example of the violent murder and incorporation of an
active identification. For as Stockton pointed out, the tunnel epitomizes the emasculation
(and therefore queerness) of the Bottom. The destruction of the tunnel along with the
people that it failed, depicts Fuss’s description of identification as a “monstrous
assassination” in which “the Other is murdered and orally incorporated by being entombed
inside the subject” (34). In this sense, both the victims of National Suicide Day, and the
Bottom itself, become participants in a large-scale identification and sublimation process
by entombing themselves within the tunnel. The event illustrates a macrocosm of Nel and
Sula’s halted identification, a communal catharsis of Sula’s loss.
After the last National Suicide Day, the narrative fades away again twenty-four
years—plunging the Bottom into the black hole signified by lack of narrative. When the tale
picks up again, it is 1965 and “things were so much better… or so it seemed” (Sula 163).
Although things may seem “better” for Black Americans in the sixties, the Bottom has
finished its steady descent down into the valley, as the white people have moved up to the
hilltops (166). Stockton indicates that the gesture to the changing times at the start of the
chapter “plays sorrowfully, ironically even, for the Civil Rights was a time of symbolic
reversal” (112). For while Black Americans fought for basic humanity and participation in
white America, they lost places like the Bottom, which “had been a real place” (Sula 166).

71

Unlike the opulent summers of Nel and Sula’s youth, the Bottom appears now in fall, the
dying season illustrating Nel’s return to Sula. Nel happens upon Eva in the old nursing
home accidentally, but in doing so performs a protracted confrontation with Sula. Eva
greets Nel with an immediate question: “Tell me why you killed that little boy” (168). Nel
replies that Sula was the one who drowned Chicken Little, to which Eva responds, “You.
Sula. What’s the difference?” (168). This scene invokes Nel and Sula’s first rejection of the
heterosexual as well as their interconnected identification. To recall Thurschwell’s reading
of Chicken Little’s death, it constitutes “the poles of Sula’s self-loss and self-creation” (121).
Nel leaves the nursing home, and walks to the cemetery where Sula is buried, looks at the
gravestones. The meeting with Eva effectively “collapses time and space,” calling back
across Nel’s lifetime to her childhood as she leaves the cemetery (Quashie 206).
Nel walks down the road in an October rain back towards identification with her
girlfriend. Nel looks to the tops of the trees, to nature and to Sula, and realizes that “All that
time, I thought I was missing Jude,” crying “O Lord, Sula… girl, girl, girlgirlgirl” (Sula 174).
The cry has hovered just out of sight in the form of that ugly grey ball since Nel failed to cry
twenty-four years prior, waiting to be released. Michelle Pessoni argues that “it takes a long
time for Nel to realize Sula is indeed the missing center,” potentially because she has been
imprisoned in the grey ball, floating at the edge of Nel’s perception (442). Just before she
cries, “a soft ball of fur broke and scattered like dandelion spores in the breeze,” releasing
her identification with Sula from where it has been bound for twenty-five years (Sula 174).
The cry also functions as an identification ritual. Thurschwell reads Nel’s cry through
Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917), in which a “patient in the grip of
melancholia… recognizes that he has lost something, or someone, but is not certain what he
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has lost, in part because of his ambivalence” (123). Thurschwell believes that Nel’s
heterosexual attachments to Jude have masked her love for Sula. To push this reading
further into terms of identification, Fuss also invokes “Mourning and Melancholia,” which
expresses that “identification works as a form of elegy, remembering and commemorating
the lost object by ritually incorporating it in serial replacements… the subject paradoxically
destroys the love object only in order better to preserve it” (38). Nel’s cry re-incorporates
her lost love object, her sister, her other: Sula. It is a cry with no bottom and no top,
inherently upside down and inverse, like the queer Bottom. Feng believes that it has the
queering effect of releasing “her from the mechanism of repression” (101). This allows Nel
to make her way back to Sula and thus back to herself. For Quashie, the relationship
between Black girlfriends is an “ongoing unsettling process,” one that leads “toward her
embrace of her own volatile self” (197). In some ways, this scene is a return to the
identification processes of Nel and Sula. In a separate sense, it is the beginning of Nel’s
development. Perhaps if there were to be a second novel, it would be called Nel.
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Conclusion: “What Transpired Among the Women”
“Together, we spoke a language that was, in tone and content, structure and
style, different from the way either of us spoke with men or the way men, we
thought spoke with each other, different in ways that went beyond the
length of our friendship.”
Louise Bernikow, Among Woman

In the original German definition, the bildungsroman genre is meant to demonstrate
the linear development of a young protagonist as he ascends into adulthood. Pin-chia Feng
notes in her article, “We Was Girls Together,” that such a rendering reflects the
“quintessential western bourgeois (male)” perspective (40). The white European and
American versions of the bildungsroman perpetuate the myth of the independent agent on
a journey to “identity.” By the traditional criterion, Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar and Toni
Morrison’s Sula both “fail” to deliver their protagonists into development. In order for the
“coming of age tale” or bildungsroman to survive as a genre, the definition must be
expanded. The Bell Jar and Sula prove that a protagonist’s development necessarily occurs
in the context of their community, family, and relationships. The coming of age tale which
abides by the reductive perception of autonomy and “identity” outlined in the
bildungsroman form cannot authentically portray reality. Diana Fuss’s “identification,”
diagrammed in Identification Papers (1995), is a more useful psychoanalytic tool for
reading self-development. Not only is identification a non-linear act of necessary
“repetition and remembrance,” but it also uncovers the fundamental instability of selfhood
in being “only ever partially secure and never complete” (34). A genre about “self” such as
the bildungsroman does, cannot purport such rigid definitions of human behavior. Thus,
reimagining the bildungsroman term along the lines of identification pushes the form to a
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version which can support all narratives—not just the white and male. Both The Bell Jar
and Sula move the genre away from individualist masculine leanings of the white male
bildungsroman mode.
Toni Morrison and Sylvia Plath may be contemporaries by some definitions, but
they occupy greatly different social, ideological, and theoretical spaces. Sula was published
just two years after the American release of The Bell Jar. Sula begins in 1920 and ends in
1965, locating Esther’s 1953 plotline in one of the invisible years after Sula’s death and
before the end of the novel. In The Bell Jar, Esther’s developmental arc is structured along a
violent reckoning of her sexual trauma. The intrusion of heterosexual violence interrupts
her development, which only continues once she has destroyed and incorporated the
ambivalent identification with her abuser, per Fuss’s description of “the violence at the
heart of identification” (34). Serially attempting suicide, Esther regresses to a semiotic state
of childhood, which permits her metaphorical rebirth into the symbolic order of human
language. Once rebirthed in the white, female space of the private hospital, Esther
constructs queer identifications with women and begins her proper development. In Sula,
Nel and Sula follow a dual development of interdependent identification in the queer
context of the Bottom, their Black community which exists outside of white American
ideology. Nel and Sula’s friendship exemplifies Fuss’s point that Freud’s “homosociality is
never very far from the homosexuality it claims to ‘repress’” (45). The girls’ relationship,
identification, and identification all break apart when white paradigms of heterosexual
ideology draw Nel into marriage with a man, Jude Green. The developmental plot is halted
for Sula until her death and for Nel until she acknowledges that Sula was always the one
she loved, not her husband. The plotlines of both novels regularly resist normative
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trajectories; doubling back on themselves, leaving off completely, and concluding without
much certainty. Catherine Belsey, in Critical Practice, discusses how the “classic realist”
narrative of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries emphasizes ideological “closure,”
which “ensures the reinstatement of order, sometimes a new order, sometimes the old
restored, but always intelligible because familiar” (75). Belsey argues that “closure” is
merely a performance of ideological conscription. Novels which problematize ideology, like
The Bell Jar (to an extent) and Sula, culminate in open endings. The irregular composition
of The Bell Jar and Sula therefore should place these novels as bildungsromans more
authentic and culturally significant than the original German texts.
Sula questions compulsions of Black adherence to white American cultural projects
and pushes Black women’s queer love forward by highlighting female relationships and
criticizing heterosexual ones. The Bell Jar engages a proto-feminist discourse on white
women’s obedience to heterosexual norms of fifties but fails to effectively disparage or
even begin to interrogate America’s, Esther’s, and the text’s pervasive white supremacy.
These ideologies reflect not necessarily just what the authors consciously wrote into the
text, but more so the unconscious cultural inscriptions of the text. Valerie Smith, in “Black
Feminist Theory and the Representation of the ‘Other’,” defines Black feminist literary
theory as a way of reading inscriptions of race (particularly but not exclusively blackness),
gender (particularly but not exclusively womanhood), and class” that are already always
present in all “modes of cultural expression” (370). Smith’s definition is useful insofar that
it permits readers of any positionality to engage culturally and socially nuanced readings of
texts, but because it surpasses the problem of authorial intent. Though Esther, Nel, and Sula
all identify as heterosexual, engage in sex with men, and rarely if at all consider the
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possibility of desiring women, each is only able to form mutually beneficial identifications
with other women. Queerness need not be sexually explicit in the text, it is inscribed by the
divisive heterosexual ideology depicted in both. Each protagonist learns the inadequacy of
heterosexual intimacy and its consistent interruption of identification-based development.
White heterosexual ideology of the American midcentury requires each character to
assume desires for men, but also creating a breach between men and women in both the
white genteel spaces of New England and Black working-class communities of rural Ohio.
The Bell Jar and Sula depict racially enclosed spaces: the Bottom subverts “Black” as
the unmarked category rather than white, while Esther’s private hospital perpetuates a
white supremacist ideal by its exclusion of racial others. The Black inhabitants of the
barred from inclusion in white American heterosexual ideology by inverse economic
relations of the Black family wherein the wife can find work, but the husband cannot. As
Katherine Bond Stockton suggests in “Heaven’s Bottom,” that accord with white paradigms
permits “upward mobility” that inevitably “proves theologically and sexually bankrupt, but
downward mobility spells economic suicide for marginalized people” (113). The Black
inhabitants of the Bottom are thus required both economically and by white American
ideology to pursue upward mobility, but unable to do so without sacrificing Blackness. The
Bottom is a site of contradictory discourses, a town slowly collapsing in on itself. Nel and
Sula embody the alternative, a “something else to be:” a relationship which exists outside of
white heterosexual American ideology, the Black girlfriend (Sula 52). The white feminine
space of the private hospital in The Bell Jar allows Esther to escape heterosexual ideology,
but also fosters her preexisting loyalty to white supremacist beliefs and actions. Esther’s
subjectivity as a white woman relies on her precarious position in the white American
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social hierarchy, perceived to be “below” white men but believing herself “above” people of
color. Thus, only white women can offer the possibility of identification for Esther. While
Nicholas Donofrio asserts she is “not lacking for female role models,” Esther cannot attach
herself to any of the white women she encounters prior to the private hospital (244). In
order to develop identification and heal from sexual trauma, Esther must find her place
within the male symbol order by first returning to the semiotic in her suicide attempts. The
Bell Jar thus rejects heterosexual discourse but promotes white nationalism. Free of both
men and racial others in the private hospital, Esther is free to pursue identification with
Joan, her white, wealthy, lesbian identified double.
Fulfillment of the queer narrative through death operates as a critical determinant
in the theoretical framework of both novels. Esther’s serial unsuccessful suicide attempts
represent the murderous side of identification: Fuss’s “monstrous assassination” of the
other (34). Sula’s death signifies an annihilation of the heterosexual and the sublimation of
the queer—“Wait’ll I tell Nel” (Sula 149). Additionally, Esther’s last suicide attempt and
Sula’s death are both figured in terms of sleep and water. Sula describes her death as a
feeling of sinking “down until she met a rain scent… Who was it that had promised her a
sleep of water always?” (149). Esther’s “death” personifies as the ocean: “Then, at the rim
of vision, it gathered itself, and in one sweeping tide, rushed me to sleep” (Plath 169).
Watery death is significant in both scenes as each connotes a rebirth. Sula returns to
identification with Nel in death while Esther emerges on the other side of death in rebirth,
reading to meet her double. Both novels also end in cemeteries and with an invocation of
the semiotic. At the end of Sula, Nel visits Sula’s grave and mourns lost relationship for the
first time since it ended with “a fine cry—loud and long,” lamenting: “We was girls
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together” (174). This moment has the same critical function as Sula’s death, heralding the
reinstatement of identification and a new beginning for Nel’s development. Similarly, The
Bell Jar ends in the graveyard at her double’s burial. Esther’s relationship with Joan is much
less spiritually and emotionally enduring than Nel and Sula’s by all value judgements. So
instead of crying for Joan, Esther does not cry out, she turns inward and listens to her body
speak, assuring her of its persistence: “I am, I am, I am” (Plath 243). Preceding her release
from the hospital in the last passages, this scene affirms the identification of Esther and
Joan as the only queer climax available in the ideological context of the novel.
The Bell Jar and Sula, though different in social context and ideology, engage similar
theoretical discourses to explain the development of their protagonists. Esther, Nel, and
Sula’s social positionalities restrict personal agency (Nel and Sula’s more than Esther’s),
prohibiting the possibility of a classical bildungsroman plot. Both are novels of predevelopment and broken development, wherein coming of age is only possible through
identification with a queer double. Positioning queerness and double as the most essential
feature of development de-centers the bildungsroman from its traditional definition of
solitary growth. Louise Bernikow’s text Among Women (1980) chronicles literary meetings
of women—author to author, character to character, reader to text. According to the
history of women’s representation in literature, when “a man walks out of a room, leaving
two women behind,” the two “will argue. Or nothing will happen” (3). Bernikow contests
this assertion by analyzing hundreds of texts which exemplify exactly what does happen
when two women are left alone in a room. In the final chapter, Bernikow struggles through
a reading of women positioned against one another in the dichotomy of “light” and “dark,”
both racially and morally. In summation, she asks the reader to consider oppositions as
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“made and not given, constructed and not chemical or theological,” claiming that when this
is done, dark and light “can be seen differently and changed” (264). Her perspective is wellmeaning and empathetic, but outdated, seeking to bring women together on the topic of
being women across racial boundaries. Bernikow employs a race-blind philosophy, rather
than a race conscious one. Elizabeth V. Spelman, in “The Ampersand Problem” alleges that
“We cannot hope to understand the meaning of a person’s experiences, including her
experiences of oppression, without first thinking of her as embodied, and second thinking
about the particular meanings assigned to that embodiment” (84). Spelman’s article is also
outdated, but her philosophy is correct. Examining the ideology which has influenced the
living perspectives of Black women and also white women is critical to understanding their
texts. Nel and Sula’s development is fundamentally structured around their Black
womanhood, just as Esther’s is entirely dependent on her position as an upwardly mobile
white woman. Reading identification into these texts, reading queerness into these texts,
reading trauma, reading family, and reading community into these texts, relies on
comprehensive consideration of the ideology surrounding these texts. Such a reading is
paramount. De-centering the bildungsroman along the lines of identification as to include a
wider amount of narratives is possible only with deference to ideology.
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